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On New Year's Eve 1993, there was little indication 
that popular President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was about 
to take a monumental fall. Mexico was in the midst of 
unprecedented prosperity. The world's oldest ruling 
political party, Mexico's PRI, enjoyed substantial support. 
Allegations of corruption within an authoritarian regime 
were now frivolous charges obscured by economic success. 
The nation was poised to become a major player in the global 
market; vying with Japan to be the second largest trading 
partner of the U.S.A. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the largest trading 
partner of the U.S., Mexico and the United States became 
effective January 1, 1994. 
Just after midnight 1994, the Zapatista National 
Liberation Army (EZLN) went to war in the southern Mexican 
state of Chiapas. Approximately 2500 peasants (mostly 
indigenous men of Mayan descent) had mobilized against the 
Redacted for PrivacyMexican government. The violence sparked world wide 
interest in the human rights of Mexican Indians. Ten days 
later, as the EZLN retreated into the jungle, an 
international audience remained captivated by the struggle. 
The Mexican Army did not advance. The EZLN refused to lay 
down its arms. 
Within the year, the Mexican economy collapsed. Soon 
thereafter, President Salinas went into voluntary exile 
amidst charges of high crimes against the state. 
Was it just a coincidence that the rebellion coincided 
with the implementation of NAFTA? Did the treaty really 
present such an enormous threat to Mexico's underclass? Did 
NAFTA contribute to the nation's political problems? The 
following thesis answers these questions. It is the product 
of years of travel and study throughout Chiapas and Mexico, 
both before and after the rebellion. The intricacies of the 
relationship between NAFTA, the Mexican government and the 
EZLN are revealed. 
The government's position and rebel demands are 
reconcilable. This is an important conclusion. But Mexico 
is a poor country embroiled in a rebellion to the south as 
well as a precarious economic treaty with the world's 
wealthiest nation to the north. In addition, the EZLN has 
come to represent the world's beleaguered poor in an era of 
free trade. As Mexico's past and present are explored, 
conclusions about the country's future have implications 
that go beyond NAFTA. ©Copyright by Steven J. Veit 
July 30, 1999 
All Rights Reserved NAFTA and Chiapas: Problems and Solutions 
by 
Steven J. Veit 
A THESIS 
submitted to 
Oregon State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the 
degree of 
Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies 
Presented July 30, 1999 
Commencement June 2000 Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies thesis of 
Steven J. Veit presented on July 30, 1999 
APPROV 
Major Professor, representing Foreign Language and 
Literature 
Committee Member, representing Speech Communication 
Committee Member, representing Education 
Chair of Department of Foreign Language and Literature 
Dean of,  uate School 
I understand that my thesis will become part of the 
permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. 
My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any 
reader upon request. 
teven J. Veit, Author 
: 
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for PrivacyTABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION  1 
ZAPATA AND HIS LEGACY  18 
THE EZLN  32 
NEOLIBERALISM  54 
COMMON GROUND  70 
CONCLUSION 
Agrarian Reform and Education  82 
END NOTES  87 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  100 NAFTA and Chiapas: Problems and Solutions 
Introduction 
On New Year's Day 1994, a big story overshadowed some 
of the football scores and parade highlights. News 
broadcasts across the United States flashed scenes from 
Mexico of rifle toting guerrillas clad in ski masks. The 
rebels tookover several towns, including San Cristóbal de 
las Casas, Chiapas, and were poised to march north to the 
capital, Mexico City. By the end of the day, the reports 
from Mexico inspired as much controversy at my New Year's 
party as the football games. Many of my friends, drawing 
comparisons from other Latin American countries, were 
convinced that a civil war was imminent south of the border. 
Unlike my buddies, I had studied and traveled extensively 
throughout Mexico. I assured them that the rebels were 
still hundreds of miles south of Mexico City and that Mexico 
was far more stable than most of its Central and South 
American neighbors. Nevertheless, I expected intervention 
by the Mexican Army. After all, wouldn't the United States 
military intervene in a similar situation within its own 
borders? Not to do so would invite civil war. Between 
highlights of the football games and the Chiapas rebellion, 
I convinced most of them and myself that the situation would 
probably be resolved after a few days of battle. 
I was merely half right. The Mexican Army,did 
intervene; but five years later, the struggle rages on in 2 
Chiapas. Clearly, despite my studies and travels, in 1994 
my knowledge of Mexico's political and social problems was 
severely limited. I had not overlooked the nests of abject 
poverty which led to the violence in Chiapas. The splendor 
of the land and the friendliness ( simpatía) of the people 
simply distracted me. Plus, I knew that Mexico, unlike so 
many Latin American countries, had not suffered a violent 
revolution in decades. The country afforded a sense of 
stability. 
For most of this century, Mexico was stable. Over the 
last seventy years, a single political party has ruled. 
Major conflicts were carefully avoided with the help of an 
agrarian reform policy that catered to the campesinos 
(peasants) as a distinct constituency. Most other Latin 
American governments never attempt to accomodate peasants to 
this degree.' The uprising in Chiapas, however, proved that 
the Mexican government had only fashioned a facade of 
stability. 
I returned to Mexico on several occasions after the 
revolt subsided. Soon it was clear that I had to modify my 
conceptions of the nation in order to examine the problems 
in its southern state, Chiapas. It is difficult to remain a 
believer in a stable Mexico while doing research in this 
volatile region. I attended political rallies, followed 
human rights observers, interviewed accessible individuals, 
and absorbed as much local literature and news as possible. 3 
Unlike some activists and professional journalists in 
Chiapas, as a rule I avoided the frequent conflicts and 
bloodshed. Nonetheless, at one juncture I could not resist 
a little excitement. I pilfered a plastic yellow vest in 
order to attach myself to over 100 similarly attired Italian 
"human rights observers"' who were headed to Taniperlas, 
Chiapas. I crashed the party. They kicked me off the bus. 
I was lucky. A riot broke out upon their arrival in 
Taniperlas. Dozens were injured. Thirty or so members of 
the Italian "international invasion force "3 were 
subsequently banished from the country. 
They had been looking for trouble. A riot was 
inevitable. At first, I did not realize how explosive the 
situation was and wanted to be part of the action. A bit 
later it became clear that I did not miss anything of great 
importance. My experiences and investigations had led me to 
the conclusion that the trouble in Chiapas was symptomatic 
of far larger lingering economic and social problems 
throughout the entire country. These problems have gained 
greater significance with Mexico's new role as an equal 
economic trading partner with the world's wealthiest nation, 
the U.S.A. I had finally managed to acquire a larger 
understanding of the people and events that led to the 
Chiapas Zapatista rebellion of 1994. 
Mexico desires prosperity and liberty. NAFTA, an 
economic partnership with the nation's affluent northern 4 
neighbors, presents endless possibilities. It also 
heightens the class disparities in Mexico which contributed 
to the upheaval in poverty stricken Chiapas. 
Mexico faces a host of challenges as the 21st century 
approaches. Expectations run high for a nation that could 
become a fully integrated and dynamic member of the global 
community in the coming decades. However, the country must 
find solutions to the penury and hopelessness that shackle 
so many of its people. The poor in any country are never a 
pretty sight. But the poverty of Mexican campesinos, 
subsistence farmers who can barely sustain themselves and 
their families, has few equals. Chiapas is not the only 
Mexican state harboring guerrilla activity. Yet it is the 
powder keg that will serve as a litmus test for how the 
nation forges its future. 
The vast majority of Mexicans are not part of the 
Zapatista movement and do not consider the Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas an important personal issue.' Although 
the Chiapas rebels may not have millions of supporters 
nation wide, they do not have throngs of detractors either. 
There are many who disparage them, but as a largely 
indigenous movement the Zapatistas represent much of Mexican 
society. About 90% of all Mexicans are mestizos, those of 
Indian and European, usually Spanish, descent.5 Aztec, 
Mayan, Toltec, Olmec, indigenous heritage is embraced. It 5 
is preserved in museums, literature and ancient ruins; 
celebrated in Mexican music and art, murals and statues. 
Like the Mexican population, campesinos, peasants, are 
also predominately mestizo. But a major proportion of 
Chiapas' population, and campesinos in particular, are full 
blooded descendants of the ancient Mayan cultures that 
settled this part of the world over 1000 years ago. To be 
sure, there are a great number of other more recent Indian 
settlers of Chiapas from various other parts of Mexico. 
This fact is evidenced by the different indigenous languages 
spoken in the state. However, in Chiapas, where the 
Zapatistas themselves reflect the specific Indian cultures 
of the region, the movement still does not enjoy the support 
of a majority of the campesinos or general populace.' 
Chiapas' indigenous /campesino communities are often 
more polarized then united. One noteworthy age old problem 
rooted in the Spanish conquest continues to separate them: 
land ownership. 
The question of agrarian reform divides all the people 
of Chiapas. Some remain loyal to the government for 
personal and communal benefit or because they see hints of 
economic as well as political reform in this new era of free 
trade. Others have justifiably lost their patience. 
Poverty is rampant, government promises of land reform go 
unfulfilled and campesinos are inhumanely exploited for the 
cheap labor they provide to large land holders. Of this 6 
group, a few thousand opted for violence to solve the socio- 
economic problems of the rural poor. 
On the first of January 1994, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States of 
America and Mexico officially took effect. Meanwhile, 
Chiapas, southern Mexico, suddenly found itself in a state 
of war. The Zapatista National Liberation Army, known in 
Spanish as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(EZLN), declared war on the government and the "... federal 
Mexican Army, the pillar of the dictatorship from which we 
suffer, monopolized by the party in power and headed by the 
federal executive... Carlos Salinas de Gortari" (Diaz 21). 
El Despertador Mexicano (The Mexican Awakener), the group's 
official publication, reported "The Declaration of the 
Lacandon Jungle" which included the military goal to defeat 
the Army and advance to the capital. There was also a plea 
to the rest of Mexico for support "in the struggle for work, 
land, housing, food, health, education, independence, 
liberty, democracy, justice and peace" (Diaz 21). The 
uprising left more than one hundred dead, hundreds wounded 
and thousands displaced in Chiapas before President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, who sent in the Army to quell the 
revolt, declared a unilateral cease fire on the twelfth of 
January. The EZLN, or Zapatistas as they were soon 
universally recognized, retreated into the Lacandon Jungle. 7 
They welcomed the cease fire initiative and suspended all 
military operations, but refused to relinquish their arms. 
The EZLN's social and military goals justify their call 
to arms. Beyond their rhetoric of revolution, the 
Zapatistas maintain they are Mexican nationals. A champion 
of the poor, they demand adherence to the Mexican 
Constitution. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI in 
its Spanish initials), Mexico's ruling party, is held 
responsible for betraying historic commitments to social 
welfare and land reform by opening the country up to free 
trade and foreign investment.' This betrayal is all too 
familiar to indigenous and campesino communities. 
Indian communal lands were appropriated by the 
latifundios (large estates) during the decades leading up to 
the Mexican revolution (1910 -17). While the dictatorship of 
Porfirio Diaz (1876 -1911) brought a certain degree of 
stability and economic growth to Mexico, millions of Indian 
campesinos remained virtual serfs. As a result, the 
revolution of 1910 consisted of numerous uprisings by 
indigenous communities, including the one commanded by 
Emiliano Zapata. As the revolution came to a close, 
Mexico's new president, Venustiano Carranza, was forced to 
endorse agrarian reform. 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 
proclaimed, 
...that all land within the territory claimed 
by the Mexican state belonged to the Mexican 8 
'nation' [and] formally sanctioned the com- 
munal landholding system, known as the ejido, 
which had been outlawed in 1856, and declared 
that henceforth communal lands could not be 
sold (Almazán 46). 
The ejido encapsulated much of Mexico's social and 
agricultural reforms.* It promised land to 
campesino /indigenous communities through protection of 
communal lands or partition of large estates. 
Since the revolution, the pace of agrarian reform has 
been agonizingly slow. Still, rural populations, regularly 
subjected to economic exploitation as a source of cheap food 
for urban dwellers and cut -rate labor for factories, have 
seemed "willing to sacrifice economic development for 
territorial security and viewed the Mexican state as the 
guarantor of the latter" (Almazán 46). 
Chiapas produces a large percentage of Mexico's natural 
gas and hydroelectric power as well as considerable amounts 
of coffee, beef and lumber. In contrast, most of Chiapas' 
*The ejido is "... a community -based system of land tenure 
in which the government protected privately held parcels and 
communal lands within the community from the market. Before 
changes to the constitution in 1992, ejido lands could not 
be bought, sold, or rented although a widespread 
clandestine rental market existed. The ejidos existed under 
state sponsorship, which encouraged political patronage, 
corruption, and centralization of power within the ejidal 
communities. Also part of the social sector are the 
agrarian communities, which are indigenous lands based on 
historical claims and which have operated more autonomously 
than the ejidos" (Barry 12 -13). 9 
rural communities lack electricity. The state's standard 
of living as well as its education levels fall far below the 
national average while infant mortality rates remain well 
above that of the rest of Mexico.' In spite of this 
exploitation of human and natural resources, as long as the 
government supported the ejido system and considered 
petitions for the return of communal lands to indigenous 
communities, the campesinos could depend on a measure of 
territorial security. Accordingly, before the EZLN's 
declaration of war, unrest and violence tended to be 
sporadic and localized. However, indigenous territorial 
security began to crumble as Mexico suffered through 
agricultural and economic crises in the years leading up to 
NAFTA. 
By the late 1970s, the Mexican government realized that 
a new agricultural policy was necessary in order to 
stimulate the rural sector of the economy. The ejido came 
under criticism as an unproductive economic drain on the 
nation.' The ejido system had created the inefficient 
minifundios which condemned much of the country's peasants 
to subsistence farming and poverty on tiny plots of land.' 
Only in a few regions of northern Mexico did collective 
ejidos work well. Private farms still owned some of the 
best territory, including fifty percent of all irrigated 
land, but they produced seventy percent of marketable food 
on twenty percent of the land and made themselves 10 
indispensable to the country, especially during times of 
crisis.' Through the 80s, Mexico's economy faltered. The 
ejido shouldered a lot of the blame. Criticism of the ejido 
reached an apex in the 90s when president Salinas proposed a 
series of amendments to Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution that "included the creation of mechanisms for 
the privatization of ejido lands; freedom for ejido owners 
to sell their property; and the establishment of procedures 
to enable private firms both national and foreign to 
invest in the countryside" (Almazán 48 -9). These amendments 
were necessary to stimulate the free trade and foreign 
investment required for Mexico's entry into NAFTA. They 
also led to a loss of legitimacy of the Mexican government 
in the eyes of most indigenous communities. Large numbers 
of Mexicans were outraged. The EZLN capitalized on this 
outrage. Nothing short of further government betrayal 
seemed to be at hand. 
The feared violations of campesino territorial security 
were heightened by Mexico's entry into NAFTA. The ejido was 
being destroyed and it looked as if existing communal lands 
would eventually be sold to private firms. The situation 
was reminiscent of the days before the revolution when a 
vast majority of land was held by hacendados (landowners) in 
latifundios. Agrarian reform, one of the tenets of the 
revolution, was in danger. Therefore, the uprising in 11 
Chiapas may be seen as a reaction to the economic opening of 
the northern Mexican border.12 
Many in Mexico feel a certain solidarity with the 
plight of the indigenous people of Chiapas, but the 
magnitude of the EZLN uprising surprised all Mexicans.13 
Certainly, on New Year's Day 1994, I personally had no idea 
how well prepared and armed the Zapatistas were; hence, my 
naive prediction of a few days of battle. I was not alone. 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, expecting U.S. 
congressional approval of NAFTA, not only suppressed facts 
concerning the existence of an armed group in Chiapas, but 
also gravely underestimated the Zapatista's strength as well 
as the social and political dimensions of the problems that 
led to the insurrection.14 For most Mexicans, it was not 
the chronic misery of the indigenous people or the existence 
of an armed group in the state of Chiapas that surprised 
them, but the outbreak of  violence.'s 
In the United States, reactions to the events in Mexico 
varied. State Department spokesman Mike McCurry, facing a 
host of NAFTA critics, continued to bolster NAFTA and denied 
that the conflict had anything to do with the free trade 
agreement.16 Despite State Department claims, it was no 
coincidence that the rebellion coincided with the 
implementation of NAFTA. The EZLN had made it clear that 
NAFTA was the equivalent of a death sentence for indigenous 
Mexican communities.'' Al though there was a swift and more 12 
or less effective military response from the Mexican 
government against the EZLN, exaggerated reports of events 
made it easy to believe that Mexico was suffering a national 
crisis. 
The Zapatista rebellion was stymied in Chiapas and any 
solidarity amongst the Mexican people and the EZLN failed to 
produce a political base broad enough to inspire a violent 
national revolution. While the events in Chiapas did not 
represent a minor conflict, neither did the uprising ever 
reach the dimensions often reported in the Mexican and 
American press. The rebels have avoided a larger conflict 
and total military defeat due to the impact their struggle 
has had on a sympathetic public, both within and outside 
Mexico. The Mexican government has been unwilling to 
exchange horrendous international publicity for a military 
victory. 
The Zapatistas, with the enigmatic Subcommander Marcos 
as its spokesman, launched an effective publicity campaign 
that started with the rebellion in Chiapas and continues to 
this day. Marcos reflects this campaign with a rhetorical 
style described by Mexico's Nobel Prize winning poet Octavio 
Paz as "... unequal and full of the highs and lows of a 
roller coaster, imaginative and lively... Sometimes vulgar 
and coarse; other times brilliant and eloquent, satiric and 
realistic, tiresome and sentimental ..." (Delarbre 368 -9). 13 
Marcos' rhetoric and the images of the Zapatistas 
cloaked in ski masks make for favorable propaganda and have 
produced a popular victory of sorts for the EZLN in the 
months and years following the initial armed rebellion. One 
effect of the publicity campaign has been an obfuscation of 
the original declaration of war and military goals of the 
EZLN. As a result, many noted analysts, such as Paul Rich, 
have come to the conclusion that the "Chiapas uprising has 
never been about ultimate military success ..." (74). But 
any examination of the EZLN cannot ignore the fact that the 
Zapatistas have resorted to military action to resolve 
socio- economic problems. 
The rhetoric and theater of the EZLN could not be 
effective without the existence of critical, social and 
economic problems in Chiapas. For the Chiapas guerrillas, 
It is obvious that Mexico cannot take full 
advantage of NAFTA without enormous amounts 
of capital. They suspect that the majority 
of the present working class population can 
never realize any advantage from the 
agreement. The indigenous in states such as 
Chiapas see NAFTA as making their pitiful 
situation even worse (Rich 79). 
Thus, the publicity campaign by the EZLN is directed against 
NAFTA and its political- economic agent neoliberalism, the 
contemporary incarnation of capitalism, as the social and 
economic philosophies responsible for the plight of 
indigenous people and the rural poor. In addition, 
suspicions of the capitalist giant north of the border are 
not without merit. America's economic muscle and military 14 
might are always a concern. And nationalist Mexico still 
smarts from what it regards as U.S. armed intervention in 
the Mexican American war (1847 -8) and the 1910 -17 Mexican 
Revolution. 
The revolt in Chiapas reveals what can happen to a 
developing country thrust into the world market at the 
expense of privatization and the loss of social programs. 
The Chiapas guerrillas, always eager to appeal to all 
Mexicans, are not exaggerating when they claim that NAFTA is 
associated with disaster for the entire Mexican underclass. 
The harsh reality is that it may be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to protect the poor from economic pitfalls in a 
free market.18 In economically powerful countries such as 
the United States, world market alliances engender debate 
and controversy. On the other hand, in relatively poor 
countries like Mexico, these alliances can be entirely 
menacing to enormous segments of society that cannot hope to 
compete against wealthier nations. People become divided 
and sides are inevitably chosen. Few in Chiapas are 
independent, and the PRI has a surprising number of 
supporters. Political and diplomatic options are regularly 
eschewed. Violent revolts can be expected. 
The impoverished conditions in Chiapas and other parts 
of Mexico predate NAFTA, contemporary neoliberalism and the 
PRI, which has been the dominant political party for the 
last seventy years. During the course of its history, 15 
Mexico has been described as a poor, underdeveloped Third 
World country. Most recently, under the PRI, this 
characterization has been modified little but to add that 
the country has become "... a monarchy with republican 
forms, centralized [and] antidemocratic." (Krauze, la 
dictadura 181). Author Mario Vargas Llosa has pointed to 
this system as "the perfect dictatorship ".19 The 
centralized economic policies that accompany this government 
have resembled, at best, those of much of the rest of Latin 
America: "[a] mercantilist version of capitalism ..." with 
all the "poverty, discrimination [and] underdevelopment that 
dictatorships generally bring" (Vargas Llosa 25). In this 
respect, it is somewhat ironic that the rhetoric of the EZLN 
vilifies neoliberalism and NAFTA contemporary realities 
which could portend an economic freedom that Mexico has 
never experienced. Furthermore, with the advent of NAFTA 
and the Zapatista rebellion, political change is evident. 
The PRI, for the first time in its history, has lost 
elections in various states as well as in Mexico City and 
now shares power in the Mexican congress. Could it be that 
the Zapatistas (who are not allied with any particular 
political party) and NAFTA are unwitting partners in this 
important political plurality? Maybe. But NAFTA also 
represents a form of repression not altogether distinct from 
that of the dictatorship of Porfirio Dlaz and the decades 
leading up to the Mexican Revolution when the ejido was 16 
outlawed. In any case, the Mexican road to modernization in 
a free market is fraught with the perils of poverty, threats 
to campesino /indigenous communal lands and hints of Yankee 
imperialism that alternatives offered by a charismatic 
revolutionary group such as the EZLN have found popular 
support. 
The crisis in Chiapas did not halt Mexico's entry into 
NAFTA, and conditions have yet to change in southern Mexico. 
The Mexican Army, the EZLN, and the Guardias Blancas 
(paramilitary groups usually supported by large land 
holders) remain armed and poised for action. Accounts of 
bloodshed are gruesome reminders that revolutions die hard. 
Moreover, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and apparent 
failure of communism, the EZLN has found a sympathetic 
audience among Leftists throughout the world. The uprisings 
in Chiapas come at a time when large segments of the Left 
are discouraged, and the revolt has become a rallying point 
for those who are suspicious of the benefits of NAFTA and 
similar neoliberalist schemes.20 It appears that NAFTA and 
the uprisings in Chiapas are intimately connected; and there 
is still no end the rebellion in sight. 
As Mexico integrates itself into NAFTA and seeks 
solutions to internal turmoil, an examination of the 
relationship between the two principal positions that 
continue to be at loggerheads could produce solutions to a 
crisis that has implications throughout the Americas. 17 
Although economic liberalization in Mexico (represented by 
the Mexican government, NAFTA and what is now commonly 
referred to as neoliberalism) and the arguments of the EZLN, 
which support the ejido and political reform, appear 
mutually exclusive, the positions can be reconciled. Both 
sides see themselves as patriots, but the nationalism 
actually divides the nation. In this era of global trade 
and economic treaties (Mexico has recently added economic 
treaties with other Latin American nations and is certain to 
reach an agreement with the European Union), 
21 all will 
benefit from a united Mexico. The following historical 
accounts will be followed by an analysis which endeavors to 
discover how the development of political plurality in 
Mexico together with a policy of gradual economic 
liberalization can contribute to real Mexican stability and 
prosperity. 18 
Chapter 1 
Zapata and his Legacy 
The figure of Emiliano Zapata possesses a 
resonance, a great power and presence for 
Mexicans and indigenous peasants, including 
the Mayans, who always, as much in the pre 
hispanic era as during the colonial and 
revolutionary periods, have remained in the 
periphery of Mexican society.' 
The endless surf and beaches of Baja California. 
Mariachi music. Salsa (the music and the hot sauce). The 
simpatía of the people. The rain forest and ruins of 
Palenque. Spanish that flows from the lips of women like an 
exotic melody. These were my first impressions of Mexico. 
Enough to satisfy any young man's palate. Then I began to 
study in Mexico. I learned the language and more about the 
country. I grew up. Stunning scenery, waves and salsa were 
still to be found. But there were also ragged, barefoot 
Chiapas campesinos lugging firewood and water to their 
slums. Shanty towns behind the Marriot Hotel at the Mexico 
City airport. Cardboard shelters in Tijuana. Sometimes I 
placated myself with assurances that similar conditions 
existed in my country, the U.S.A., and that economic 
opportunity had raised the standard of living for many in 
both nations. I looked forward to the implementation of 
NAFTA and the growth of the middle class in Mexico that 
might alleviate much of the nation's poverty. 
After the Chiapas rebellion of 1994, my investigations 
forced me to admit that the conditions in Chiapas, and 19 
perhaps the greater part of Mexico, really did not compare 
with those anywhere in the U.S.A. People stricken by 
poverty in the ghettos of Chicago or the Indian Reservations 
of the Dakotas might liken their conditions to those of 
third world countries such as Mexico;2 but if Mexico is a 
third world country, Chiapas is its grimy underbelly. The 
natural beauty of the state cannot hide the nests of poverty 
that multiply and fester below most third world norms. My 
optimistic outlook with respect to NAFTA and the rise of a 
large middle class in Mexico was soon replaced by a pathetic 
sympathy for Chiapas' peasants. I delved further into the 
causes, history and goals behind the Chiapas rebellion. My 
feelings were tempered a bit as I examined the EZLN, its 
conflicts with the government and disputes with a number of 
campesino communities,' and studied the implications of 
NAFTA as well as neoliberalism. 
I would like to think the following analysis is a 
result of impartial research. This is unlikely. The 
quixotic challenge of traveling through Chiapas and southern 
Mexico in an attempt to understand the Zapatista cause was 
more fulfilling than my bookish grappling with 
neoliberalism. On both sides, my sources are predominately 
literary; and I cannot lay claim to any sensational, 
gripping adventures in Mexico. But even a jaded capitalist 
gringo on a scholarly mission through a rugged country has 
to be moved by the struggles of Mexico's Indians and 20 
campesinos that the present day Zapatistas represent. 
Furthermore, the namesake of the EZLN, Emiliano Zapata, now 
signifies much more to me than Hollywood images of a Mexican 
cowboy and revolutionary. His figure does possess a 
resonance, and his presence looms large not only in Chiapas 
and within the EZLN, but throughout the entire country. 
"From the perspective of his worshipers today, Zapata 
was a simple man ready to purge Morelos of tyrants who 
robbed the people of their lands and took the bread from 
their lips" (Ruiz 317). There is no doubt that Zapata is an 
icon of the Mexican revolution (1910- 1917). The manner in 
which his name is evoked within the current Zapatista 
movement demonstrates that the man is still venerated 80 
years after he was betrayed and murdered. 
Though he may be worshiped, no man is born a 
revolutionary. Zapata became one almost against his will 
In 1909, he was a novice village leader in the state of 
Morelos. Zapata studied community records to determine land 
and water rights for campesinos whose agriculture permits 
were routinely denied even for subsistence farming. After 
repeated legal appeals, the hostility of his enemies was 
undiminished. Undaunted, Zapata created his Plan of Ayala. 
Signed by Zapata in 1911, the Plan of Ayala called for 
the return of stolen communal lands to campesino and 
indigenous villages. The latifundios were not to be 
destroyed. But the hacendados were expected to give land 21 
back to those who held the proper deeds; or give up a third 
of their territories -with compensation -for the good of all 
Mexicans. In 1914, at the height of the revolution, Zapata 
took a more radical position. Urban property in enemy hands 
was to be nationalized and communal ownership of farm land 
was decreed. This was the impetus for a revival of the 
ejido.' 
Zapata sought an economic revolution and was willing to 
pay the price with blood.5 In December of 1914, his 
popularity and generalship brought him and the Zapatistas to 
Mexico City where he occupied the presidential palace with 
another charismatic leader of the revolution, Pancho Villa. 
"At this moment, when [Zapata] was at the height of his 
power, [his] natural anarchism showed its generous and 
tragic content" (Krauze, Mexico 294). Zapata refused to 
hold any position of power and offered to burn the 
presidential chair "to end ambitions. "6 He was also 
unwilling to subordinate himself to Villa and abandoned the 
capital. Subsequently, Villa's government collapsed and he 
escaped to the north with his troops as Obregón and Carranza 
took the city. 
Meanwhile, Zapata turned south to his roots in Morelos. 
He dominated this region, expropriating or destroying 
latifundios as well as exacting taxes and protection money 
from the hacendados he allowed to remain in business. 
Zapata's reticence to govern in the capital did not thwart 22 
his agrarian reforms in Morelos. His appointed mediators 
settled all disputes over territorial boundaries. At the 
end of the revolution, with Villa defeated and Carranza in 
the presidential palace, Zapata's Plan of Ayala still 
garnered national support, and he remained the dominant 
military and political force in Morelos. 
With the drafting of the 1917 constitution, Carranza 
was faced with an assembly of the growing mestizo class 
which envisioned a Mexico ruled by true Mexicans, Indians 
and mestizos.' As a result, the new president was obligated 
to adopt the basic principles of Zapata's Plan of Ayala. 
The news was received with little fanfare in Morelos. 
Carranza, a large landholder himself, had consistently and 
personally disappointed Zapata in the past by resisting any 
pressure for land reform. For most of Mexico, the 
revolution was over. But Zapata, convinced that Carranza 
would be overthrown, pledged to keep fighting. Although 
Zapata's troops were diminished and fraught with infighting, 
Carranza was unable to defeat them. Zapata, the indomitable 
defender of agrarian reform, became more famous than the 
president. He was a legend in his own time who survived 
battle after bloody battle. 
The circumstances surrounding the death of Emiliano 
Zapata, at thirty -nine years of age, add to his legend. 
Riding describes the treachery of officers and a desperate 
president willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in order 23 
to destroy an old nemesis who, up until then, had been 
insuperable: 
In April 1919, [General] González ordered one 
of his officers, Colonel Jesús Guajardo, to 
feign defection to Zapata's side with 500 men 
and, to give credibility to the ploy, he even 
allowed the 'rebels' to attack a federal 
column and kill fifty -nine soldiers. On 
April 9, Zapata met with Guajardo and agreed 
to confer the following day at Guajardo's 
head quarters in the Chinameca hacienda. 
After waiting in the sun for hours outside 
the hacienda, Zapata finally accepted an 
invitation to a beer and a meal inside. As 
he and a ten -man escort rode through the 
gates of the hacienda, he was shot down by a 
fusillade, dying instantly. His body, draped 
over a mule, was taken to González's head- 
quarters in Cuautla that night. As poor 
peasants paraded past Zapata's coffin, many 
of them crying with grief and trembling with 
fear, Carranza and the 'revolutionaries' in 
Mexico City raised glasses of champagne to 
celebrate the demise of the 'gangster' (46 -7). 
Pancho Villa met a similar fate, though routed in 
battle years before he was murdered in 1923. The two great 
heros of the Mexican revolution actually lost the war to the 
political and economic elites of the day. Officially, 
Zapata was an outlaw in post- revolutionary Mexico, but his 
legacy would never die. "Eager to appease the peasants who 
had supported the popular guerrilla, the winning forces 
wrote many of Zapata's demands into the new constitution and 
erected monuments to the fallen rebel across the country" 
(Oppenheimer 101 -2). Agrarian reform became a pillar of the 
new government and history was rewritten. Zapata and Villa 
were transformed into victorious revolutionaries.' 24 
Most of the combatants and casualties of the Mexican 
revolution were not mestizos but Indian, the indigenous 
people of Mexico. At the time, they comprised almost half 
the population of the country. Practically all were 
peasants. Generally, they united with mestizos, many of 
whom were also peasants, campesinos. To the north, 
campesinos who joined Villa or the nationalist armies of 
Carranza reacted to joblessness and falling agricultural 
wages. By contrast, local land and water issues drove 
Zapata.9 
Loss of ejido lands during the modernization of the 
virtual dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876- 1911), as well as the 
economic stagnation in the last years of his rule, gave rise 
to campesino revolutionary armies that have been unique to 
Mexico throughout its history. In no other Latin American 
country has the peasantry assumed such a significant role in 
the major national political movements of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.10 Because of the racial and cultural 
makeup of these armies, Indian demands were often 
indistinguishable from those of other peasants. "Even the 
Zapatistas of Morelos and Guerrero, who in the main spoke 
Nahuatl and wore Indian costumes, were fighting for their 
communal lands rather than any ethnic identity" (Riding 
201). Mestizos did not necessarily identify themselves as 
Indian even though they lived in predominantly Indian 
communities. However, Zapata's demand for the restitution 25 
of communal lands cannot be easily separated from the desire 
of indigenous people to maintain, control and develop their 
own cultures." Accordingly, Emiliano Zapata's call for 
land reform, tierra y libertad (land and liberty), crossed 
bloodlines and united much of the rural poor.  Agrarian 
reform became a large part of the Mexican national agenda in 
the decades that followed the revolution. Therefore, the 
martyred Zapata does appear a victorious revolutionary. 
If there was victory for Zapata, it was hollow. Land 
reform did become law, but was enforced selectively and 
sporadically in the post revolutionary years. Mexico's 
agrarian reform subordinated campesino communities and 
organizations to the state, obligating them to apply to the 
government for usufruct rights on land that in many cases 
historically belonged to them.12 A huge national 
bureaucracy was created to hold out the promise of land 
reapportionment and discourage peasants from joining 
political or social organizations hostile to the ruling 
party. Even in the 30s, when President Lázaro Cárdenas 
distributed 18 million hectares to campesino pueblos, he 
routinely suppressed campesino organizations considered too 
radical by the government's corporatist structures.13 
Cárdenas tried to encourage communal farming in the 
Indian tradition by reviving the ejido system. In order to 
ensure that large landholdings would not reappear, it was 
illegal to sell or rent an ejido. The state retained 26 
ownership of the land and peasants who worked an ejido could 
not mortgage it. They often opted to rent or sell the land 
illegally or, more frequently, subdivided ejidos into small, 
individual plots. "Built into the political solution [of 
the ejido system] were the seeds of social and economic 
disaster" (Riding 183). The resulting ejidos condemned the 
campesinos to the perennial penury of minifundismo 
(subsistence farming) on inefficient parcels of land. 
Agrarian reform soon became a myth perpetuated by Cárdenas' 
successors through fiery rhetoric as well as expropriation 
and distribution of some private farms.14 
In order to maintain order in Mexico, it is imperative 
to have campesino support. To these ends, the PRI has 
always invoked the name of Emiliano Zapata. It has also 
controlled the countryside through campesino organizations 
such as the National Peasant Confederation (the CNC in its 
Spanish initials), the Union of Peasants and Workers of 
Mexico, and the Independent Peasant Confederation. For 
decades after Cárdenas' presidency, these peasant 
organizations served as a chain of command from the 
government directly to the campesino masses.' Renewed 
promises of land distribution kept poor rural districts 
loyal to the PRI. The PRI controlled the country. 
Often, there was "... little relationship between the 
amount of land that [the government] claimed to have 
expropriated and the area that was in fact handed out to the 27 
peasants" (Riding 184). It was not uncommon for campesinos 
to receive a small percentage of the land officially 
expropriated by the government for ejidos. As a Mexican 
population explosion created new generations of landless 
peasants, the ejidos were increasingly formed on infertile 
semi -arid land. Hardship in the countryside increased and 
eventually induced flight to urban areas. 
Not everyone escaped to the cities. During the 50s and 
60s, the government permitted campesinos to settle in the 
Lacandon Jungle of Chiapas. In this isolated wilderness, 
hundreds of miles south of Mexico City or Zapata's home 
state of Morelos, Mexicans secured ejido lands and in many 
cases united with native inhabitants. Peasants from all 
over the country were represented. The languages spoken 
ranged from Spanish to indigenous Nahuatl, Mixe, Totonaco 
and Chontal. "To emigrate to the most inhospitable region 
of the southeast of the country, perhaps one of the most 
inhospitable in the world, signified for all of them the 
beginning of the path to liberation" (Diaz 46 -7). These 
people did not emigrate alone; the Catholic church 
accompanied them. Along with the church, came Bishop Samuel 
Ruiz whose liberation theology might guide all to their 
freedom as forseen in the Sacred Scriptures.' 
While thousands of peasants escaped to urban areas or 
the Lacandon Jungle, Mexico experienced what Barry refers to 
as a "Green Revolution" (29). For three decades (1940 -70), 28 
the government concentrated on modernizing commercial 
agriculture by looking to the United States and other 
industrialized countries for its model of agricultural 
development.' Some ejido petitions were granted, but when 
Mexican agriculture experienced a crisis in 1970, campesino 
ejidos were perceived as an inefficient drain on the 
economy. This crisis has persisted, to some degree or 
another, until today. There is no single explanation for 
the crisis, but Mexico's inability to reconcile land reform 
commitments with an emphasis on high -yield industrialized 
production seems to have set the stage for stagnation.' 
Basically, the Mexican state has failed in its unenviable 
task of supporting small communal farmers while giving a 
free hand to commercial ones. A wide range of critics have 
repudiated this policy as contributing to a form of archaic 
mercantilism,19 or criticized it as exclusive "state 
capitalism" (Barry 141). The crisis deepened when global 
supplies of grain became scarce in the early 70s. Suddenly, 
Mexico could not feed itself. Some economic problems were 
alleviated by a Mexican oil boom. However, because the 
country had been an exporter of food and was able to sustain 
itself in the past, there was fear that increases in food 
imports would jeopardize the nation's sovereignty.20 
Mexico needed to stimulate its agricultural sector. 
The inefficiency of the ejido was often blamed for food 
shortages. As a result, free market solutions and 29 
amendments to the agrarian reform provisions encapsulated in 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution became more and more 
prevalent in the 70s and 80s. Land handouts and government 
promises continued, but high production farming on large 
tracts of land was the necessary goal. By the mid 80s, 
after the government had seized some 96 million hectares for 
repartition into ejidos, the collision course between 
peasant demands and production goals crystallized: the 96 
million hectares would still not accommodate the millions of 
peasants who petitioned for land. "The government had 
become a prisoner of the agrarian myth that it had invented: 
land handouts were not the answer, but officials dared not 
say so because the peasants would not believe them" (Riding 
189) . 
Unrest is rare where campesinos farm ejido land. In 
Zapata's home state of Morelos, where over 2.5 million 
peasants have benefited from agrarian reform policies, the 
hope of further land handouts preserves order among the 
millions who still wait for their plots of land. Thus, 
reality or myth, agrarian reform has effectively demobilized 
much of the peasantry and maintained a measure of peace.' 
The campesinos of Chiapas find it difficult to believe 
that the government has been prisoner to an agrarian myth. 
Agrarian reform has never been effective in the state 
because of the resistance of local elites.22 These large 
land holders, hacendados, represent a consolidation of 30 
properties that raises production and cuts down on the 
inefficiency of minifundios. However, they are also heirs 
to the same oligarchy that appropriated land during Mexico's 
colonial and postcolonial periods.23 Inevitably, these 
latifundios accelerate "class divisions in rural Mexico and 
thereby increase social tensions ..." (Barry, 124). 
Tensions are then exacerbated by a government bureaucracy 
that on average delays approval of campesino land claims in 
Chiapas for seven years even when those claims are 
provisionally accepted by state authorities. In addition, 
many peasant organizations, most notably the CNC, are of 
little help. Localized constituencies have been abandoned 
in favor of a national productivist orientation.24 
Chiapas has been a hotbed of activity for quite awhile. 
During the last decades, campesinos formed a variety of 
alternative peasant organizations associated with communist 
and socialist parties as well as clandestine guerrilla 
operations. It was just a matter of time before a militant 
group came to the fore in the name of Mexico's campesinos 
and Emiliano Zapata. 
Before the EZLN rebellion of 1994, guerrilla activity 
in Chiapas was sporadic. Most violence consisted of 
conflicts between peasants, agrarian reform authorities and 
ranchers. The violence usually followed land grabs by 
communal groups of campesinos. Because Mexican law 
authorized campesino land claims only within seven 31 
kilometers of peasant settlements of twenty or more 
households, peasants often found it necessary to settle 
desirable, private territories in order to initiate an 
ejido.25 Frequently, these peasants were armed. Landowners 
retaliated to such land grabs with armed force and hired 
guns known in Chiapas as Guardias Blancas (White Guards).26 
Confrontations of this nature have a long and sordid 
history. In the 70s, in order to appease the peasants, 
campesinos were permitted to settle in eastern Chiapas, the 
last frontier of the Lacandon Jungle. Grasslands soon 
displaced tropical forests as newcomers, unaccustomed to the 
cultivation techniques of the Lacandon Indians, introduced 
intensive cultivation of the traditional peasant 
cornfield.27 Coffee and cattle also became large cash 
crops. Land was easily exhausted. Settlers became 
separated into groups of subsistence farmers and those 
marketing cash crops. The conflicts continued and more 
Indians and other campesinos were forced deeper into the 
diminishing Lacandon Jungle. In this jungle, the EZLN was 
born. 32 
Chapter 2 
The EZLN 
Beyond the context of the Mexican Revolution and the 
rest of this historical review, the literature exhibits 
numerous inconsistencies concerning the origins of the 
present day Zapatistas. In order to determine the 
beginnings as well as the goals and ideology that drive the 
EZLN, I was tempted to venture into some prohibited zones of 
Chiapas in search of firsthand information. The government 
has several good reasons for prohibiting entrance into these 
zones. Activists, large groups of human rights observers 
and journalists often provoke violence. On occasion, 
violence between opposing groups of campesinos, landowners 
and /or the Guardias Blancas erupts suddenly; and government 
officials may want to hide their own involvement in the 
conflicts as well as protect those who do not live or work 
in these areas. In December of 1997, when 45 civilians, all 
indigenous men, women and children, were massacred in 
Acteal, Chiapas,' I was in the bordering state of Oaxaca. 
Upon reading the news, I was in no hurry to return to 
Chiapas. Traveling the road of discovery in a bullet -proof 
vest or coffin was not in my plans. In the spring of 1998, 
my last trip to Chiapas, the forest was ablaze. Wild fires 
show no respect for battle lines. Zapatista territory was 
consumed with the same facility as the rest of the 
countryside. With the smoke growing thicker day by day, 33 
there were rumors of government plans to smoke -out the 
Zapatistas. (I later learned that the entire country was in 
the midst of its worse fire season on record with much of 
the smoke and ash crossing the boarders of Texas to the 
north and Guatemala to the south.) I became a bit 
disoriented. It could have been the smoke or the whispers 
in my ears, but I actually entertained ideas of wandering 
blindly into the forest to await the escape of Subcommander 
Marcos. I bided my time. Soon it was apparent that many 
questions as to the beginnings and ends of the EZLN would be 
better left to literary sources. Oppenheimer and Le Bot 
each interviewed Marcos on separate occasions after the 
rebellion. And Dlaz, Collier, Montemayor and Barry have 
spent years studying the socio- economic problems of the 
region. They seemed much more qualified than I was. Once 
relieved of my fantasy in the jungle, I steered clear of the 
prohibited zones and dedicated myself to the heroism of 
collecting data and conversing with forthcoming individuals. 
Montemayor stipulates that the origins of the EZLN are 
related to dozens of smaller but similar struggles that have 
sprouted up throughout Mexico during the last thirty years. 
These struggles reflect the profound, complex roots of the 
Zapatistas.2 Montemayor also cites Díaz on several 
occasions. Diaz links the EZLN to the emergence of the 
National Liberation Force (the FLN in its Spanish initials) 
in Chiapas. The ultimate goals of the FLN were to take 34 
political power for the campesinos of the countryside as 
well as the workers in the cities and install a popular 
republic with a socialist system. Eventually this would 
lead to the defeat, militarily and politically, of the 
bourgeois.' Apparently, part of the plan was to create the 
EZLN after combining the struggles of the urban proletariate 
with those of the Indians and campesinos. Nothing short of 
the defeat of capitalism was the stated goal. When 
questioned by Díaz, several Zapatistas confirmed the link 
with the FLN. Logistic and political problems resulted in 
the formation of the EZLN long before the goals of the FLN 
could ever be achieved. In San Cristóbal de las Casas, I 
asked Graciela, a former assistant to Bishop Samuel Ruiz (an 
influential and high profile Zapatista supporter and 
proponent of liberation theology) about the connection 
between the EZLN and the FLN. She replied, "They are 
basically one and the same." 
While Díaz is specific in describing the origins of the 
EZLN, Oppenheimer is even more direct and to the point. 
Drawing conclusions from Zapatista communiques, internal 
rebel documents and his interview with Marcos, Oppenheimer 
does not demure when he states, 
...there is little doubt that the Zapatistas 
grew up as a traditional Marxist guerrilla 
group, which changed its rhetoric after the 
January I rebellion, when its media -savvy 
leader discovered the advantages of playing 
up the Indian participation in his uprising- 
the one aspect of his revolt that had captured 
the world's imagination (45). 35 
Oppenheimer declares that the leadership of the EZLN is 
mostly white middle -class and that they had succeeded where 
Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and others had failed: "The white 
middle -class Mexican rebel leaders had won the allegiance of 
scores of Indian communities" (45). 
Collier is more diplomatic. His analysis is a striking 
reminder that the current Zapatistas have much in common 
with their forbearers whose call for tierra y libertad 
united the rural poor during the Mexican revolution. He 
stresses that although the Zapatistas are demanding rights 
for indigenous peoples, "...they are first and foremost 
calling attention to the plight of Mexico's rural poor and 
peasants, both indigenous and nonindigenous" (7). In 
discussing the origins of the EZLN, Collier understates the 
role of "... independent and mostly left oriented peasant 
organizations that formed during the 1970s" (54) and focuses 
on religious conflicts between diverse Protestant, 
Evangelical, and Catholic churches. In his view, these 
conflicts "created an environment in which only a secular 
movement, like that of the Zapatistas, could hope to unite 
peasants across religious lines and attract both women and 
men, young and old" (56). 
Collier notes that the Indigenous Congress of 1974, 
organized by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, marked the beginnings of 
many radical peasant groups, including EZLN.4 This was the 
first official convention of Indians convened so indigenous 36 
people themselves could voice their problems and offer their 
own resolutions without government intervention. Current 
Zapatista demands reflect a majority of the issues raised at 
the Indigenous Congress of 1974, among them land, health, 
education and economic concerns. However, the Catholic 
Church's attempts at winning converts from other religions 
prevented it from providing a platform from which Indians of 
all beliefs could speak with a universal voice. Undeterred, 
Bishop Ruiz organized thousands of lay workers to win 
converts in the Lacandon Jungle. Liberation theology, 
adapted by Bishop Ruiz and others from the book of Exodus, 
helped in these efforts. It states that the oppressed 
Indians of Chiapas are in effect the people of Israel 
fleeing a corrupt regime equal to that of biblical Egypt. 
The destiny of the Chiapas Indians is to build a new society 
in the Lacandon jungle. 
According to Collier, liberation theology "... has, in 
recent years, been at the center of social justice movements 
throughout [Chiapas]" (54). The EZLN, recognizing religious 
schisms, has retained its popular base by distancing itself 
from any particular theology. It has galvanized its 
followers along secular lines. On January 12, 1994, the 
Zapatistas emphasized this point: 
We have no links to Catholic religious 
authorities, nor with those of any other 
creed... Among the ranks, the majority are 
Catholic, but there are also other creeds and 
religions... We are not religious, nor are we 
against religion. We respect beliefs, but 37 
each one of us is in the battle for our 
poverty. There are catechists among us, also 
sabáticos (Seventh -Day Adventists)... 
(Collier 65 -6). 
When questioned by a journalist in May of 1994 about the 
EZLN's connection to liberation theology Marcos replied, "We 
liberate ourselves but without theology" (Le Bot 52 -3). 
The census of 1990 revealed that nearly 90% of Mexicans 
declared themselves Catholic.' Practically all the Mexicans 
with which I have come into contact are Catholic. In 
Chiapas, when the subject of the Zapatistas' secular appeal 
was raised, the question was generally received with curious 
blank stares. After a little prodding, Gabriel, a hotel 
security guard and former soldier who had been stationed in 
San Cristóbal de las Casas after the initial rebellion, 
frankly asserted, "The problems in Chiapas began when the 
Catholic Church started losing so many Indians to the 
Protestants." On a scorching afternoon in Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
Chiapas, with smoke from the wild fires hanging in the air 
like a filthy curtain, I sought refuge in a local bar. 
After a couple of icy cervezas, an architect sitting on the 
stool next to me proffered, "In many respects, it is a 
religious war." Personally, I believe the Zapatistas have a 
secular appeal. On the other hand, I doubt many join the 
movement for secular reasons. Religion, most specifically 
the Catholic Church, plays a large role in the lives of most 
all Mexicans. And the Zapatistas, particularly Marcos, have 
shown themselves to be masters at appealing to a great 38 
variety of religious sentiments. Ironically, liberation 
theology, which has been associated with the Catholic Church 
in Chiapas (not the Vatican), may actually facilitate 
appeals to various religions. Graciela first studied 
liberation theology at a Jesuit university in Guadalajara 
and proceeded to apply this education at the Roman Catholic 
diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas under the tutelage of 
Bishop Samuel Ruiz. Despite Zapatista disclaimers, its 
secular temperance and liberation theology's overall failure 
to unite campesinos, Graciala's claim that liberation 
theology "has inspired Zapatistas of all religions" rings 
true given her experience and Bishop Ruiz's overt support 
for the guerrillas.' After all, Chiapas campesinos have a 
long divided history. Just because liberation theology 
cannot unite a majority does not mean it has not found a 
home within the popular EZLN. 
According to Collier, the physical beginning of the 
EZLN (not the official naming of the organization) was in 
1983 when Marcos, then known as Rafael Sebastián Guillén 
Vicente, and five "...idealists from Mexico's north arrived 
[in Chiapas] to join forces with dissident peasants and 
Indians in a movement that immediately went underground to 
begin military and political organizing" (81). Barry gives 
a simpler synthesis of the above mentioned origins of the 
Zapatistas: "More than two decades of campesino organizing- 
shaped to varying degrees by leftists, the Catholic Church, 39 
and state agencies contributed to the formation of the 
EZLN" (160).' 
The origins of the EZLN can provide a basis for 
examining the ideology that helped inspire and incite this 
mass of campesinos. Zapatista ideology should not be 
confused with its goals. Apart from the original military 
goals that accompanied the 1994 declaration of war, 
Zapatista objectives of a legitimate democracy for Mexico as 
well as food, education, work, housing and health care for 
Chiapas' campesinos strike a universal chord and are not 
difficult to understand or admire. Even the call for a full 
revival of the ejido system, while complex in practice, is 
not an altogether unjustified or surprising demand. 
However, these goals are often eclipsed by distrust of the 
EZLN's means to its ends. Doubts about Zapatista ideology, 
its solutions, motives and leadership, arose in the nascent 
hours of the 1994 revolt. 
"We want socialism...in our case it will be different. 
Here it is going to work" (Krauze, Mexico 784). The Indian 
commander who pronounced these words during the January 1, 
1994 occupation of San Cristóbal was not just expressing his 
beliefs. He had been educated to these ends. He embodied 
Zapatista training and elicited memories of the defeated, 
passé Latin American communist guerrilla. A revolutionary 
loaded to make us bear his untenable solutions. The 
Zapatistas can never completely shed this image. But thanks 40 
to Marcos, the word 'socialism' has not reappeared on the 
list of Zapatista demands. 
Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, a.k.a. Subcommander 
Marcos, was not supposed to assume the leadership role 
during the takeover of San Cristóbal de las Casas. He was, 
by all succeeding reports, one of the white, middle -class 
organizers of the guerrilla group. But the voice of 
authority was to be that of an Indian officer, Commander 
Felipe. Felipe was not up to the task. Within hours of the 
occupation of San Cristóbal, the Zapatistas not only had to 
prepare for a government assault on their positions, they 
also needed to manage the international media which 
descended upon the bucolic, colonial town in force. Felipe, 
a fair representative of his campesino troops, spoke 
rudimentary Spanish and not a word of English, the two 
languages hurled around town by the press corps and 
terrified tourists. The commander issued prepared 
statements in his native tongue and halting Spanish. He was 
quickly overwhelmed by the media offensive. Marcos seized 
the initiative. 
He had certainly prepared himself for the opportunity. 
Before his disappearance into the Chiapas jungle in the 
early 80s, Marcos graduated from college with a degree in 
philosophy, wrote a graduate thesis on French Marxism, and 
had been a teacher of graphic design and communications. As 
a native, educated Mexican, his Spanish was flawless. He 41 
also spoke passable English as well as a couple of 
indigenous dialects. At San Cristóbal's central plaza, the 
abundantly armed Subcommander spoke with the press; his 
expressions concealed by a black ski mask. Marcos exuded 
authority. Yet he was amicable and exhibited a wry sense of 
humor. When reporters asked him why he, unlike Commander 
Felipe, covered his face, Marcos responded with a chuckle, 
"Well, those of us who are the most handsome must protect 
ourselves." He promptly admitted that he might not be very 
handsome but did enjoy "making propaganda" for himself.' 
The press loved him. 
Marcos also manipulated the propaganda of the EZLN. 
After the takeover of San Cristóbal, Commander Felipe read 
from The Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, first published 
in the January 1, 1994 edition of The Mexican Awakener, the 
previously underground Zapatista publication. The 
declaration made no mention of Indian rights and virtually 
ignored indigenous people as an ethnic group.' At its core 
was class struggle and agrarian reform. This should come as 
no surprise. The original Zapatistas of Emiliano Zapata, 
not driven by class struggle per se, were also fighting more 
for communal lands than for any particular ethnic rights or 
identity. Within days, Marcos shifted the focus of 
Zapatista aims and ideology, and saved the movement from 
military defeat. 42 
Sometime during the first week of the rebellion, Marcos 
realized that communist rhetoric and propaganda did not play 
any better in Mexico than it did in most of the rest of the 
world. It was obvious the insurgents were not going to 
incite a national revolt. Yet something else was equally 
evident. The media, particularly the western European 
press, was fascinated by the plight of oppressed Indians 
intent on overthrowing the Mexican government. With the 
Mexican Army closing in, Marcos changed tactics. Suddenly 
the war was presented as a specifically Mexican, indigenous 
rebellion for human rights that had nothing in common with 
the failed communist revolutions in Central America and 
other parts of the world. The story was a media and 
military coup for the EZLN. As the Zapatistas were forced 
to retreat into hiding, the government could not advance in 
the face of mounting international scrutiny. 
Marcos and the Zapatistas quickly became media stars. 
To accomplish this feat, the Zapatista leadership simply 
publicized an identity (oppressed indigenous campesinos) 
that had already been reenforced within the movement and 
could easily be projected to a sympathetic public. Once 
protected by the public eye, the EZLN initiated a media 
offensive with an all out attack on neoliberalism (the 
Zapatistas brandish the term and thus avoid the communist 
implications of anti capitalist rhetoric) in conjunction 
with a call for indigenous rights. But the original 43 
Zapatista oratory is not easily forgotten and continues to 
raise questions about the aims and ideology of the EZLN. 
If the Zapatista uprising was not purely the work of a 
group of white, middle class, Mexico City radicals, it is 
equally improbable that it was a completely independent, 
spontaneous Indian uprising. Contrary to Zapatista claims 
of a purely indigenous leadership, the rebellion was most 
likely the result of a "...carefully planned offensive by a 
white dominated Marxist guerrilla group that had found 
considerable support among long- exploited Mayan communities" 
(Oppenheimer 49). This summation is bolstered by reports of 
Zapatista ideological outbursts at the outset of the 
uprising which called for socialism and a revolution against 
capitalism.10 These outbursts are compounded by the EZLN's 
January 1, 1994 Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle which, 
among the aforementioned demands, also calls for a 
dictatorship of the proletariate." 
Thus are suspicions aroused about the motives, ideology 
and leadership of the EZLN. These doubts and suspicions are 
profound and result in disparate reports of events and the 
preparedness of the EZLN. Descriptions of the Zapatistas as 
a poorly armed band of freedom fighters are almost as 
frequent as portrayals of them as a well trained and 
supplied army prepared for a long war. During the 1994 
rebellion, when reports of a battle between the Mexican Army 
and landless campesinos armed with wooden toy guns became 44 
public, questions as to the degree of government culpability 
were just as prevalent as doubts about the copiously armed 
Zapatista leaders who could have deceived these campesinos 
and sent them into battle like cannon fodder.' 
Militant fervor, deception and calls for class 
struggle, forged by years of attempting to follow the path 
of the famous Latin American communist revolutionary, 
Ernesto 'Che' Guervara, and Marxist Leninist ideology,13 
characterized the movement during the first days of the 1994 
uprising. But now, international support has grown for what 
appears to be a struggle for indigenous /campesino rights in 
Chiapas. The EZLN has drawn attention to the plight of 
Chiapas' peasants. Even so, persistent doubts about 
Zapatista motives and leadership recall a spent ideology 
(communism) that has run its revolutionary course in Latin 
America as well as Europe. The movement does not offer any 
clear, sustainable agenda or ideology. In many respects, 
this may explain why the EZLN has failed in its efforts to 
capture the hearts and minds of the vast majority of 
Mexicans who are in "... no mood for a social upheaval" 
(Oppenheimer 152). 
These facts are not lost on Marcos. He recognizes the 
shortcomings of communist revolutionary rhetoric and is 
purposely vague on questions of ideology as he stresses the 
Mexican and Indian roots of the movement. References to a 
class struggle against capitalism have all but disappeared, 45 
the "... option of war has been closed" (Montemayor 159), 
and the EZLN has resolved to become politically, socially as 
well as militarily effective.14 This new face of the EZLN 
has been referred to as "neozapatism. "15 Neozapatism now 
overshadows the persistent nebulous nature of EZLN ideology 
as well as doubts about its leadership, motives and 
indigenous Mexican roots. Although there is no evidence 
that this tactic gains the EZLN more support in Mexico than 
it already has, or in Chiapas where the Zapatistas remain 
popular, there is no doubt that it has attracted a large 
global audience. 
In an interview with Yvon Le Bot, Marcos recalls being 
surprised when some French supporters told him, "Lack of 
definition is what permits you [the Zapatistas] to survive" 
(Le Bot 306). Of course, he is equally pleased with himself 
when he claims, 
Anarchists see the EZLN as an anarchist 
movement, the Trotskists see clearly the 
influence of Trotsky, Maoists plainly see 
Maoist approaches taken to their ultimate 
consequences, Leninists a Leninist approach... 
everyone sees a piece, a form of zapatism 
that reflects them ... (Le Bot 306). 
Marcos goes on to insist that this lack of definition can 
not continue. At one point Zapatista ideology will have to 
be defined.16 At present, the ideology of the EZLN remains 
conveniently vague, as if the Zapatistas had "no other 
guiding light than the desperation of Chiapas' poverty 
stricken Mayans" (Oppenheimer 47). 46 
I say conveniently vague because lack of definition 
seems to be in vogue today, especially where the EZLN draws 
most of its international support: western Europe. 
Contemporary European left -of- center social democratic 
governments do not fit into the old leftist mold. The 
Communist Party exists as a practical relic while Socialists 
are often relegated to a supporting role in the workings of 
Parliament. The class struggles by workers and the poor as 
well as the social struggles for political freedom and human 
rights have been won more by a confluence of democratic 
ideals than any particular Marxist agenda. To quote William 
Pfaff, an editorial page columnist for the International 
Herald Tribune in Paris, "In practice as well as principle, 
[these] battles were won long ago, with representative 
government established everywhere in the West and the 
assumption, by states, of responsibility for at least the 
minimal well -being of its citizens."' Social Democratic 
parties and governments are now leftists bereft of ideology. 
According to Pfaff, 
Leftists politics has become problem- solving 
This is new. Twenty years ago ideological 
division dominated British, French, and 
Italian politics, and there were terrorists 
at large in West Germany. The diversity, 
pragmatism, and lack of ideology of the left 
now in power in western Europe are positive 
qualities. They demonstrate how far we have 
come from a bad past. 
Lately, with the PRI sharing power in congress for the 
first time in its history, Mexico has shown signs of a new 47 
political freedom. Still, the Zapatistas certainly cannot 
claim victory in the battles of the poor or for human rights 
in Chiapas. Theoretically, according to the European model, 
they should still be immersed in an ideological struggle; 
something akin to the stated goals of the January 1, 1994 
Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle. However, the 1994 
uprising did not unify Mexicans or inspire the massive 
protests and activism the EZLN expected.18 Consequently, 
the Zapatista ideological stance had to soften in order to 
attract national and international support. 
Marcos distances the EZLN from traditional communists 
by denying any ambitions for power in Mexico. This is also 
a distinction between the EZLN and the PRD, the dominant 
leftist political party in Mexico. The PRD still attempts 
to ally itself with the EZLN in order to attract votes. 
Because the EZLN has yet to define itself, and does not 
compel its members to vote, there has been a lot of friction 
between the two camps and the Zapatistas feel they have been 
unfairly  used.19 Despite the new face of neozapatism, the 
EZLN is not ready to solve problems by becoming politically 
integrated into Mexican society. On the other hand, Marcos 
is proud to cite Ernesto 'Che' Guervara as a referent for 
the Zapatistas, explains away ideological outbursts by some 
Zapatistas as an inevitable result of converging ideas in 
the movement, and is unafraid to admit that the EZLN was 
originally steeped in Marxism and led by middle -class 48 
reactionaries.20 According to Marcos, the EZLN has moved 
beyond its Marxist Leninist origins and has subordinated 
itself to a leadership of indigenous campesinos. 
Le Bot's interview with Marcos reveals a skilled 
communicator who has a clear grasp of how to overcome his 
critics. His focus on indigenous people who are 
"discriminated [against], always in the minority [and] 
humiliated ..." (Le Bot 22) stirs international interest 
about human rights abuses in Chiapas. Denunciations of war, 
descriptions of the EZLN as a "political and ethical enemy" 
(Le Bot 245) of the Mexican Army, and clever claims that a 
national uprising "does not mean a struggle for power but 
for a change to a democratic system " (Le Bot 196) all serve 
to assuage fears of violence. This tack puts distance 
between the movement and the failed armed struggles of 
communist guerrillas in neighboring Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. 
When questioned by Le Bot about the EZLN's January 1, 
1994 Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle which ignored Indian 
rights and called for a dictatorship of the proletariate, 
Marcos deftly responds that the demands were not Marxist but 
Social- Democratic.21 The Declaration's call for war and a 
dictatorship of the proletariate are subsequently 
disregarded as Marcos concentrates on the eleven demands of 
the Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle: work, land, roof, 
food, health, education independence, liberty, democracy, 49 
justice and peace. "Only when the first ten points are 
fulfilled will peace be possible" (Le Bot 198).22 In this 
way, it appears that these eleven demands of the Declaration 
of the Lacandon Jungle have always been a call for Indian 
rights that are also applicable to all of Mexico's poor. 
Marcos reiterates this point when he states that the EZLN is 
purely "... an indigenous movement that aspires not to be 
only an indigenous movement, that refuses to be limited to 
being only an indigenous movement..." (Le Bot 337). 
Philosophically, it looks as if the EZLN and Marcos 
started with the cart before the horse, got stuck, retreated 
and now finally have it turned around. By Marcos' own 
admissions the movement has changed course; moved beyond its 
original communist rhetoric, militarism and calls for class 
rebellion. And even if one finds Marcos a bit too media 
savvy, no one can deny that the Zapatistas have called 
attention to the grave problems facing the indigenous people 
and campesinos of Chiapas. 
The Zapatista media campaign is not limited to the 
Mexican and international press. Marcos is on the Internet 
with his own Web site. The use of such technology casts 
doubt on the rebellion as one led by peasant Indians" (Rich 
82). Nevertheless, the Internet gets the word out. Marcos 
utilized it effectively in organizing the July 1996 First 
Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism in the mountains of southern Mexico where 50 
leftists from 41 countries united to protest NAFTA and 
neoliberalism.23 The media drive has been so successful 
that to many analysts the EZLN no longer represents an armed 
rebellion but a "postmodern revolution" (Rich 74). Author 
Carlos Fuentes has pointed to the rebels as the "first 
postcommunist guerrillas," while Le Bot adds that the 
Zapatistas "...have transformed themselves into 
antiguerrillas" (76 -7). Attention is now drawn to claims 
that the rebellion has never been about military goals or 
seizing power. Le Bot even draws comparisons between Marcos 
and Ghandi 
24 
Needless to say, such comparisons are hard to swallow. 
Aside from the 1994 Zapatista rebellion, the EZLN is still 
capable of initiating violent confrontations comparable to 
those carried out by the Guardias Blancas or other 
paramilitary groups bent on removing campesinos from private 
land. Most have to do with the illegal establishment of 
autonomous municipalities in Chiapas. These municipalities 
are supported by Zapatistas who enter towns and forcibly 
remove campesinos not associated with the EZLN in order to 
form communities that are independent of government control. 
Government authorities are eventually called in to 
reestablish the townships.25 Accusations abound in response 
to the kidnapping and killings that seem to occur on a daily 
basis; and it is not always clear who the guilty parties 
are. 51 
Perhaps Zapatista ideology is not as nebulous as Marcos 
would have us believe. There is no doubt that the EZLN is 
ensconced on the left. Marcos does admit that while the 
Zapatistas never entertained the possibility of obtaining 
power, they have always assumed that fulfillment of their 
demands would come from the political left or center -left in 
Mexico.26 Yet Marcos is still capable of taking matters 
into his own hands. The First Intercontinental Meeting for 
Humanity and Against Neoliberalism is proof of his mastery 
of anti capitalist propaganda and his enduring ability to 
utilize ideology and initiate action. 
Despite the anticapitalist gatherings and rhetoric, 
Marcos is entrepreneurial. Professor Paul Rich at the 
University of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico, reports that 
Marcos has been working on a CD -Rom: 
'A space like the visit to the Louvre museum, 
but that would be a visit to the Lacandon 
Jungle'...This would supplement Marcos' home 
page on the World Wide Web, his flirtations 
with a proposed designer line of sweaters... 
and his recent appearance on the music video 
channel MTV. In Mexico these days, 
revolutionaries oppose NAFTA- -but not profits (84). 
It looks like Marcos could be an adept capitalist leading a 
leftist revolution in Mexico. This image certainly adds to 
his persona and status as an enigma. Via the internet and 
open letters to the public he has presented himself as 
everything from a San Francisco homosexual to the son of a 
Tampico furniture store owner.27 Marcos, with a pipe 
clenched between his teeth and visage perpetually hidden by 52 
a black mask, must relish his mysterious profile. It is an 
image reminiscent of the Mexican caudillo, or worse, a 
masked caudillo.28* 
In short, Zapata and Villa, the two heros of the 
revolution, actually lost the war. The Mexican government 
is prisoner to an agrarian myth,29 and leftist peasant 
rebels are led by an urban, middle class, MTV, capitalist 
savvy, masked man. How could anyone have been surprised 
when Marcos claimed in mid 1994 that "... 'fake Zapatistas' 
had made their appearance throughout the country, soliciting 
funds and offering military training[ ?]" (Oppenheimer 265). 
Were the Zapatistas real Zapatistas?... How 
could one write about a country where one 
could not only not trust what people said, 
but wasn't even sure whether people were who 
they were supposed to be? Studying Mexico, 
as one U.S. academic had once told me, was 
like working in Plato's cave: You only saw 
shadows and never knew which shadow belonged 
to whom (Oppenheimer 265 -6). 
The Chiapas campesinos have been brought out of the 
shadows by the EZLN. The rebellion has illuminated the need 
for true democracy in Mexico and better peasant 
organization. But the EZLN has not offered a clear agenda 
or positive, realistic and sustainable solutions to the 
* "... Mexico still suffers from a legacy of personalismo, 
that the perception of one's power and of whom one knows is 
more important than what one knows. Personalismo will be 
put ahead of the law, and from personalismo comes 
caudillismo (authoritarianism)" (Rich 76 -7). 53 
problems that face the poor in Chiapas or the country as a 
whole.30 Behind the masks, the Zapatistas work in the dark 
and refuse to see even a sliver of light reflected by NAFTA 
and neoliberalism. 54 
Chapter 3 
Neoliberalism 
... neoliberalism constitutes a global 
offensive against life and humanity: poverty, 
unemployment, abandonment of social rights, 
privatization of welfare and public services, 
ecological destruction, dismantling of social 
organizations, authoritarianism, ideological 
regimentation, social automation and the sub- 
mission of everything human to the logic of 
money and the market... (The First Inter- 
continental Meeting for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism).1 
...a rejection of paternalism and mercantilism... 
to bring to the continent full democracy and 
modern capitalism... to manifest the intel- 
lectual ferment and real challenge before 
Latin America. Now we have an opportunity to 
restructure the continent, making it more 
human, free and prosperous. This is the 
[neo]liberal challenge (Levine 9 -12). 
Neoliberalism: A philosophy that has as its 
ulimate goal political and economic freedom 
(Steven Veit). 
Within the goals of neoliberalism as outlined by 
Levine, is a key word that can define neoliberalism itself: 
capitalism. During the last decades, capitalism has 
accompanied revolutions in information, communication and 
transportation. Economies have opened, international trade 
agreements such as NAFTA have been created, and 
globalization has become a reality. The definition of 
'capitalism' has been amplified. The global economy, a 
logical result of the scientific and technological advances 
of the twentieth century,2 has produced a new face of 
capitalism: neoliberalism. 55 
Why 'neoliberalism'? Why not 'neocapitalism' or some 
other term that accurately describes contemporary 
globalization? Neoliberalism refers to the liberalization 
or opening of global economies to the market and 
international trade. But the word does not adequately 
describe the flexibility of this new face of capitalism as 
applied to different spheres of free trade or its 
neoclassical economic roots.' Also, if understood in the 
context of North American politics and economics, 
'neoliberalism' could have a meaning more in line with 
socialism and contrary to free market capitalism.' The word 
'neoliberalism' circumvents the implications of 
'capitalism.' It is part of the new lexicon employed by the 
left in order to distinguish itself from old communist 
rhetoric. 
Until the failure of communism in the Soviet block and 
most of the rest of the world, leftists "...pointed to the 
capitalist system as the enemy..." (Pazos, Chiapas 11 -12). 
Now the enemy is neoliberalism and, particularly within the 
EZLN, NAFTA. But in reality, neoliberalism and NAFTA still 
represent the same old enemies: 
If we analyze the expressions used by the 
majority of leftist politicians, intel- 
lectuals and journalists, they no longer 
speak of a struggle against capitalism... 
now the enemy is neoliberalism. The word 
neoliberalism is substituted for the term 
capitalism in the political lexicography of 
the neosocialists. They also do not clearly 
identify Yankee imperialism as the exploiter, 
they simply declare themselves enemies of 56 
NAFTA, which for them materializes the re- 
lationship with Yankee imperialism (Pazos, 
Chiapas 12). 
Pazos points out how many in the EZLN slip into old 
communist terminology by calling for "the end of 
capitalism,' '[a] struggle against the bourgeois,' [and the] 
'installation of socialism'... concepts which make clear 
their ideological affiliation" (12). And if we substitute 
'capitalism' for 'neoliberalism' in the above statement from 
The First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against 
Neoliberalism, the phrases sound hauntingly familiar; 
Marxist Leninist rhetoric and "... schemes expressed with 
different words" (Pazos, Chiapas 12 -13). 
In contemporary leftist rhetoric, 'neoliberalism' is 
frequently employed as a euphemism for 'capitalism.' It is 
also a term avoided by many economic analysts when 
describing contemporary, globalized, free market 
capitalism.' Still, the word 'neoliberalism' has gained 
acceptance across the Latin American political spectrum' and 
regularly describes the economic and social policies that 
have led to NAFTA (i.e., the capitalist tenets of economic 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, among 
others). It will also be used here in this sense. Yet 
those who embrace the mantle of neoliberalism transcend 
simple laissez -faire capitalism and call for political as 
well as economic freedom. One of the challenges of 
neoliberalism is to "...bring democracy to the [Latin 57 
American] continent" (Levine 9). Hence, 'democracy' is 
another key term that defines neoliberalism. Neoliberalism 
includes capitalism but also encompasses democracy as an 
indispensable political goal. 
The desperation and poverty in Chiapas and other parts 
of Latin America gain significance as we compare their 
overall standard living to conditions in other nations. 
Under the scrutiny of these comparisons, Mexico fares poorly 
when compared to many Asian countries as well as those of 
western Europe and North America. Since the end of World 
War II, two terms have come to represent this poor showing: 
'underdeveloped' and 'Third World.'' Mexico's problems are 
then understood as a matter of economic and political 
development which can be resolved by recognizing and 
applying what is known, with reasonable probability, about 
developed countries.' 
Here we begin with the powerful fact that no 
noncapitalist country has attained the levels 
of political, civil, religious, and intel- 
lectual freedom found in all advanced 
capitalisms. To make the case differently, 
the state of explicit political liberty we 
loosely call 'democracy' has so far appeared 
only in nations in which capitalism is the 
mode of economic organization (Heilbroner 74). 
Capitalism not only won, it turned into a 
marvelous machine of prosperity, led by 
people who could take an idea and turn it 
into an industry (Time).9 
The great "...economic success stories in the world 
have been capitalist, first in Europe, then in North America 
and ... Asia" (Berger 42). The question now before us is 58 
not whether capitalism can function, but how and under what 
conditions can it best benefit the masses. Neoliberalism 
answers this question by stressing the "moral superiority of 
democracy..." (Berger 48) and the empirical superiority of 
economic liberty. Market based, liberal economies have 
shown they can produce. Now it is just a matter of ensuring 
political freedom along with economic liberty. 
Developed democracies in the world today are inevitably 
tied to a capitalist system. The economies of these nations 
are mixed to varying degrees, but ultimately they are 
cemented to capitalism and economic freedom. Capitalism can 
also be found, to some degree or another, in authoritarian 
countries. Put simply, democracy cannot exist without 
economic freedom (capitalism), but capitalism can exist 
without democracy.10 Authoritarian nations may reap some 
wealth through capitalist incentives. But if the standard 
of living steadily increases, people turn their attentions 
to other necessities and the political participation of the 
masses becomes imperative." 
With the possible exception of the United States, all 
of today's democratic economic powers took off economically 
under capitalist regimes that had little democratic 
tradition. Capitalism became a catalyst for making these 
societies democratic. In turn, the societies became ever 
more productive. The link between capitalism and democracy 
is so profound that the current world economic crisis, which 59 
has yet to engulf the democracies of North America and the 
fledgling European Union, is perceived as an indictment of 
authoritarian Asian economies and poor global regulation 
rather than neoliberalism itself.12 
A purely capitalist laissez -faire country does not 
exist and neither does a completely laissez faire, free 
market world. The State does play an important regulatory 
role in every government.13 But as the 21st century 
approaches, capitalism has won the day. Interventionist, 
communist States have shown themselves to be economic 
disasters with governments that lead to a level of control 
by the State over all daily aspects of life as to make 
democracy impracticable." Authoritarian, communist 
nations, such as China and Cuba, now search for ways to 
foster private enterprise and domestic as well as foreign 
investment while turning a blind eye to "...old Marxist 
dogma that identifies private enterprise with human 
exploitation" (Mendoza 105). 
The neoliberal challenge of economic and political 
liberty is accompanied by support for private property and 
the sovereignty of the individual. Individual rights are 
vital as they, along with a separation of powers, assure 
basic freedoms even if totalitarian parties win elections. 
On the other hand, in regards to private property, "in no 
society where -as occurs in Latin America private 
property is concentrated in the hands of a very few can 60 
there be real democracy" (Vargas Llosa 31). The solution is 
to extend and propagate the access to private property so 
that more and more citizens have a chance to acquire it. In 
this way, both economic and political liberty may be 
nurtured. 
Private property and enterprises will be established as 
government opens the economy to international competition, 
allows for the privatization of companies run by the State, 
eliminates business as well as syndicated monopolies, opens 
the transportation, telecommunication and transport 
industries, and generally deregulates the market in favor of 
private investment.'5 However, in Mexico and most of the 
rest of Latin America, economic inequality is so pronounced 
that the solution to the question of private property cannot 
be left to the market alone. "Even the most ardent free 
market advocates usually acknowledge that nonmarket 
strategies are needed..." (Barry 239). The Mexican 
government, supported by the World Bank, has initiated 
nutrition programs for the poor and subsidy strategies for 
grain farmers as well as credit and financial support for 
the peasantry.16 The neoliberal ideal of economic liberty 
will also progress as the government ensures that employees, 
laborers and citizens in the lowest income brackets receive 
preferences for the acquisition of stocks within the 
companies they work for or other newly established private 
enterprises.' A government might also relinquish control 61 
of its most sacred cow in order to advance dissemination of 
wealth: The privatization of social security in Chile, 
"- -the so called provisional reform... -" (Vargas Llosa 
32), has been effective in the dissemination of wealth even 
during times of crisis. 
Neoliberalism allows for the fact that players in the 
world market cannot apply the above mentioned neoliberal 
economic policies equally amongst themselves. But Chile has 
led the way in Latin America by implementing nearly all of 
them. As a result, Chile has achieved a rate of growth and 
development unequaled in Latin America.' In April of 1998, 
Latin American leaders met in Santiago, Chile, to begin 
negotiations on the Americas Free Trade Area; a free trade 
agreement between Latin American countries that could be 
implemented by 2005.1L Unfortunately, prior to achieving 
its status as an economic leader on the continent, Chile had 
to endure years of dictatorship during economic 
liberalization before democracy finally found a foothold in 
1990. Since then democracy has flourished in the country 
along with economic liberty. 
The example of Chile is disturbing because it suggests 
that a dictatorship is necessary to foster economic liberty 
before political liberty can come to pass. On the other 
hand, as John F. Kennedy said, "'One cannot choose the time 
in which one lives'" (Echeñique, 84). Like the regimes that 
predated the democracies of Europe, the dictatorship that 62 
existed in Chile during the 70s and 80s was but one of many 
throughout Latin America.20 Now Chile and the entire 
western hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, have 
"representative, civil governments]... [and] the consensus 
of the people in favor of a democratic system" (Vargas Llosa 
23). The Chilean dictatorship under Pinochet distinguished 
itself from others in Latin America by successfully 
cultivating economic liberty before acquiescing to the 
people's demands for democracy. Economic liberty and the 
fruits of capitalism inevitably encompassed the other 
neoliberalist ideal of political freedom. This course 
prevented Chile from becoming just another Latin American 
military dictatorship, one that leaves its people with 
little in the way of political or economic freedom, and 
guided the nation to its highest levels of economic 
development and social liberty.21 
If Vargas Llosa had considered the results in Chile 
when he called Mexico the perfect dictatorship, perhaps he 
would have opted for the label 'incompetent dictatorship.' 
At least Mexico has avoided some of the flagrant, extreme 
human rights abuses that plagued the Chilean dictatorship. 
But how can Mexico be included in the Latin America of civil 
and representative governments if the country is still ruled 
by a perfect dictatorship? The answer lies in the ideals of 
the Mexican constitution. Ideals still to be realized. 63 
The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz ended with his exile 
to France in 1911. The ensuing assassinations of Villa, 
Zapata, Carranza and Obregón, the last caudillos of the 
Mexican revolution, only reinforced the authoritarian 
tradition.22 A result of the Mexican revolution was the 
First Article of the Constitution of 1917 which declared 
Mexico a Representative Republic, Democratic and Federal. A 
practical ideal compromised by post- revolutionary bloodshed. 
Along with the murders of Villa and Zapata, President 
Carranza was assassinated after a brief military conflict 
with Obregón in 1920, and Obregón met the same fate in 1928 
while campaigning to regain the presidency. The surviving 
president, Plutarco Elías Calles, escaped the bullet by 
creating the PNR (known as the PRI since 1946) and 
integrating it with the military. The PNR was born with 
perpetual power guaranteed.23 Calles assured the party's 
perpetual power by voluntarily stepping down in favor of his 
hand picked choice for president; a policy faithfully 
practiced every six years by succeeding presidents. Thus, a 
perfect dictatorship was established in Mexico's tradition 
of caudillismo without burning the constitution and igniting 
another revolution. The Legislative and Judicial branches 
were subordinated to the president. Elections have 
traditionally been won by the PRI through bankrupt agrarian 
reform policies aimed at appeasing the peasants, and the 
"...abundant use of treasury funds and a thousand 64 
subterfuges ranging from coercion to fraud..." (Krauze, la 
dictadura 183). 
The desire for democracy in Mexico is supported by the 
country's constitution. However, there is almost no 
tradition of economic freedom.24 Caudillismo has not only 
undermined democracy and the First Article of the Mexican 
Constitution, but also carefully maintained a closed 
economy. Mexico has really been an incompetent 
dictatorship; an interventionist State where mercantilism 
and protectionism have ruled.* In addition, State support 
of the ejido has impeded capitalization and created an 
enormous bureaucracy along with the minifundios. This has 
resulted in a government economy of subsistence farmers 
antithetical to the principals of private property and 
incapable of accumulating sufficient capital to feed the 
masses.25 To a degree, the masses are pacified. Just the 
same, with a multitude of peasants lie the seeds of 
disaster manifested in the illegal renting and selling of 
government ejidos. In turn, corruption is rampant and 
individual rights are routinely ignored in a nation bereft 
of political as well as economic liberty. 
* mercantilism is an economy "...in which groups of business 
men, in collusion with the government and syndicate leaders, 
split privileges and markets" (Pazos, Chiapas 31 [Trans. 
Steven Veit]). 65 
Since there are few examples of political liberty 
thriving before economic liberty, a problem arises similar 
to the question of the chicken or the egg: In a poor country 
such as Mexico, where the people have suffered poverty, 
mercantilism and a single party political system, can 
democracy usher in economic liberalization or must a market 
economy precede democratization? For Mexico, it appears 
that both economic and political liberty are developing more 
or less simultaneously. 
The PRI, responsible for Mexico's perfectly incompetent 
dictatorship, now shares power in Congress. Mexico is 
finally demonstrating some of the ideals expressed in the 
First Article of the Constitution of 1917. This does not 
indicate the existence of true Mexican democracy any more 
than the nation's entrance into NAFTA indicates an overall 
application of neoliberal economic options. The transition 
to real democracy and economic liberty is not instantaneous. 
Parts of northern Mexico have been able to take advantage of 
economic liberalization.26 But the pace of economic liberty 
matches the pace of political liberty. It is slow and 
painful for many, particularly to the south, in Chiapas. 
And if the neoliberal tenet of democracy comes to pass in 
Mexico, would the nation's suffering during economic 
liberalization translate into votes against neoliberal, 
free market policies? Perhaps. Despite this possibility, 
the flexibility of neoliberalism demands adherence to 66 
democratic choices and allows for gradual economic 
liberalization. Given the incompetence of Mexico's 
dictatorship, a legitimate democracy with strong popular 
support is probably the only system that can, sooner or 
later, promote economic liberalization and successfully 
manage the suffering of the under class.27 
It is possible that the end is near for the PRI. 
Still, it is difficult to predict a prosperous future for 
any nation that has never known political or economic 
freedom. Mexico's entire political and economic history has 
run counter to neoliberal ideals.28 NAFTA does represent a 
new ideal for Mexico: economic liberty. But the uprising in 
Chiapas has slowed progress by "...creating a climate of 
tension and insecurity that reduces investment, the creation 
of jobs and growth" (Pazos, Chiapas 87). 
Despite Zapatista claims to the contrary, neoliberalism 
and NAFTA cannot possibly be the cause of the problems in 
the region. Chiapas has suffered with the rest of the 
country through decades of an interventionist, corrupt 
State. To believe that recent attempts to open markets and 
deregulate the economy are responsible for the long standing 
poverty in Chiapas and the nation as a whole requires a 
severe case of amnesia.29 The fact that Marcos and the EZLN 
present their cause as a revolution against neoliberalism 
instantly calls into question the motives of the EZLN 
leadership. Don't they know that NAFTA and neoliberalism 67 
represent a new course for Mexico? Marcos is not a 
mysterious masked defender of Indian rights, but a 
manipulative middle -class white intellectual who has 
utilized "...the Lacandon Indians to bring his political 
messages to the world without doing anything concrete to 
resolve their immediate problems and aspirations..." 
(Mendoza 253). The armed rebellion in Chiapas is a 
political ploy; a facade for the same old tired ideology of 
the Latin American leftist guerilla. Suppositions that the 
Zapatista movement is a novel, post- communist phenomenon 
moved Octavio Paz to write: 
History has not cured our intellectuals. The 
years of atonement they have gone through 
since the end of totalitarian socialism, far 
from dissipating their deliriums and softening 
their rancor, have exacerbated them... 
(Oppenheimer 273). 
Paz went on to predict that society would receive Marcos' 
"theatrical ways...[and] manifestos with a 'big yawn' once 
his time in the limelight expired" (Oppenheimer 273). 
Before his death in 1998, Paz expressed his fear of a 
chaotic future for Mexico. Political plurality is now a 
real possibility. If the opportunity is lost, a 
totalitarian caudillo could emerge. Paz remaind an 
optimist: "'In the long run, the forces of openness, 
modernization and democracy will prevail... But it will be a 
very painful, very difficult road'" (Oppenheimer 318). 
For Mexico, there is no turning back. Political 
plurality, democracy and economic freedom are struggling for 68 
survival. Moreover, if a dictator does come to power in 
Mexico he will likely continue the traditions of caudillismo 
and mercantilism leaving little hope for economic and 
political freedom. Although the country shows signs of 
democratic reform and economic liberalization, maybe it is 
time to view the problems in Mexico as primarily political. 
The nation has shown that it cannot prosper under a 
dictatorship. Now might be the time to prove that democracy 
can lead to economic freedom. 
Up until March of 1994, the PRI had an adequate if not 
perfect record in preventing revolutions and presidential 
assassinations. The assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio 
was the first murder of a presidential candidate in Mexico 
since Obregón was gunned down in 1928. Colosio was the 
hand picked candidate of Salinas. His death, coming so soon 
after the Zapatista uprising, was a brutal illustration of 
how Mexico's problems, economic and otherwise, "...were of a 
political nature and would not go away just with economic 
corrections" (Oppenheimer 318). Unlike the capitalism that 
predated the European democracies, economic liberty in 
Mexico is integrally connected with, and dependant on, the 
political order.3o 
Globalization is a reality, not a choice;31 and 
neoliberal goals in this global economy are to have rich, 
productive neighbors, "...because the volume of commercial 
transactions and international harmony are not only going to 69 
depend on our economic health but on that of our neighbors'" 
(Mendoza 46). This is the idea behind NAFTA. The United 
States has generally always enjoyed a stable border with 
prosperous Canada. The opposite is true with respect to 
relatively poor Mexico. Why would the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico enter into an agreement with the intention of making 
an unstable situation worse ?32 To claim that free trade 
agreements are just another example of imperialism and 
exploitation is to ignore the obvious: The U.S. and Canada 
have much to gain by having a stable and prosperous neighbor 
to the south. However, prosperity, democracy, NAFTA and 
economic liberty for Mexico will be stymied if political 
remedies are ignored. 
Because of the violence and instability that followed 
the Mexican revolution, Mexico's political elite has 
systematically shunned democracy and political plurality as 
ideas that could divide and weaken the country.33 
Notwithstanding this intransigence, political parties, 
international banks, corporations and nations insisting on 
full economic liberty for Mexico before political liberty is 
realized are also working in Plato's cave; shouting in the 
dark along with the Zapatistas who scream for an end to 
neoliberalism. 70 
Chapter 4 
Common Ground 
During the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988 -94), 251 nationalized companies were privatized. 
These companies were worth some US$23 billion and 
represented but a small portion of Mexico's nationalized 
sector. The program was heralded in the U.S. as a positive 
step toward free trade. The initial wealth created helped 
Salinas convince the Clinton administration that Mexico was 
ready for NAFTA. 
Economic liberalization in Mexico spawned a new breed 
of mercantilism that spread the wealth among family members 
and cronies of the ruling elite. At the beginning of 
Salinas' presidency, there was a single Mexican billionaire. 
By 1994, toward the end of Salinas' term, there were 24 
Mexican billionaires. Also, economic disaster struck. Not 
only was the peso devalued, but the average Mexican worker 
lost 52 per cent of his real income.' Subsequent criminal 
investigations uncovered egregious crimes committed at the 
highest levels of government. Fraud, extortion and murder 
all played significant roles in the rise and fall of the 
Mexican economy. It was no coincidence that "...virtually 
all of the new Mexican billionaires were personal cronies of 
the President's brother, and most participated in the 
privatization program" (Ayres 126). 71 
Ayres makes a comparison between Mexico's problems and 
those of African and Asian dictatorships as well as Persian 
Gulf monarchies who routinely rob their countries with 
impunity. He also notes that privatization should start 
"... with housing and the land..." (126). Maybe so. Yet as 
long as Mexico is prisoner to a government comparable to the 
aforementioned corrupt regimes, there is no fear of 
reprisals for blatant looting of the country's assets. In 
this case, economic liberalization does not bring national 
prosperity nor does it represent neoliberalism. 
Mexico is showing signs of bucking the trend. Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, in order to avoid a trial for high 
crimes against the state, has lived in voluntary exile since 
leaving office. His brother, Raúl Salinas de Gortari, will 
likely never escape. He is serving a life term in jail. 
Moreover, the current president, Ernesto Zedillo, has shown 
tolerance for Mexico's new found political plurality. He 
has vowed to break with seventy years of tradition and 
endorse primary elections to select the next PRI candidate 
for the presidency.2 Even so, the economic disaster has 
fostered zealous criticism of neoliberal policies; 
especially from the EZLN. 
Le Bot mentions that the Zapatistas have "... a 
propensity to confuse a market economy with neoliberalism" 
(105). If the two are confused and repudiated equally, 
peasant communities will be condemned to a subsistence 72 
economy. In other words, the Zapatistas and campesinos in 
general really do need the external investment that a market 
economy can bring, but they do not need to compete in the 
laissez -faire neoliberal world of NAFTA. However, this 
perspective presupposes that neoliberalism always requires 
radical economic remedies irrespective of democracy or the 
needs and desires of the masses. This is simply not the 
case. As economies are 
... oriented more toward the market, we 
[still] can not know what is preferable: a 
gradual process or a radical cure... The 
process of converting a state economy to a 
market economy, in the old socialist 
societies, seemed to call for a radical cure. 
But Latin America is not eastern Europe and 
the Latin American state system is not 
socialism (Berger 51). 
Even though the roots of neoliberalism are found in 
neoclassical economics, neoliberalism is distinct in its 
flexibility while remaining synonymous with a market 
economy. Neoliberalism also conforms to the democratic 
choices of the people even when these choices conflict with 
neoliberal economic policy. After all, democratic choices 
can and do find a place in the market. 
Market liberalization in Mexico and the implementation 
of NAFTA resembled more a North American /Mexican experiment 
in trickle -down economics than neoliberalism in action.3 
The process did not make use of a multitude of neoliberal 
economic options or consider the struggle for real democracy 
in the country. While it is true that Mexico has yet to 73 
privatize many of its nationalized industries, most notably 
the oil industry, a sort of "free- market radicalism" 
( Castañeda 422) has taken hold and exacerbated economic 
disparities as well as the problem of corruption. The 
situation continues to deteriorate: 
Mexicans are indeed paying dearly for the 
long PRI rule, which has had an effect on the 
country's personality as well as its pocket- 
book, and for plunging into an experiment 
like NAFTA without public discussion (Rich 80). 
The nation's northern neighbors also plunged into NAFTA 
without much discussion and debate about the effects the 
treaty would have on Mexico. Canada and the U.S. 
demonstrated little concern over Mexico's corrupt, inept 
dictatorship, and dismissed the idea of gradual economic 
liberalization for the country.4 A full range of neoliberal 
programs were not deliberated at all before NAFTA was 
signed. Naturally, all three governments were caught 
unawares when the EZLN attacked. 
Neoliberalism is not a common referent within the North 
American political or social spectrum. Because of the 
political and economic liberty prevalent within the U.S., a 
case could be made for the success of neoliberal policies 
within that nation even though the term is rarely, if ever, 
used or recognized by politicians, the media or general 
public (not to mention a variety of economists). When the 
term is applied, the flexibility of neoliberal economics and 
the philosophy's call for democracy are ignored. 74 
Neoliberalism is thus limited to the laissez faire, free 
market world of NAFTA. 
The Zapatistas restrict neoliberalism to the free 
market world of NAFTA as well. In this world, Mexico "... 
has truly embarked on a full fledged process of economic 
integration with a 'nonequal'" ( Castañeda 322). 
Consequently, the benefits of NAFTA are confined to the 
industrialized northern part of the country. Conversely, 
impoverished southern Mexico is left unprotected. Unable to 
produce competitive products, campesinos stand to lose any 
privatized ejidos to creditors or large landholders without 
receiving sufficient capital gains to acquire the property 
necessary to prosper from the treaty. The geographic and 
economic diversity of Mexico requires the obvious 
observation: what is good for Mexico's north is not 
necessarily good for Mexico's south.' NAFTA is the radical 
laissez -faire cure for a problem that demands a different 
remedy. As the Mexican and North American sponsors of the 
treaty disregarded less painful neoliberal alternatives, 
like a gradual process of opening regional (Caribbean) 
markets first, harsh economic liberalization in Mexico made 
it easy for the EZLN to seize on "a devil neoliberalism 
and NAFTA -" (Rich 77) in order to win a media campaign. 
It really does not matter that neoliberalism encompasses 
much more than what NAFTA represents, including the 
Zapatista demand for true democracy. The EZLN is fighting a 75 
war. The manipulation and maneuvering of artillery, or in 
this case lexicography, is justified. Given the alacrity 
with which Marcos has managed the media, it is not 
presumptuous to assume that this tactic has been employed 
deliberately; another effective piece of soldiering that has 
attracted an international audience. 
The analysis offered by Pazos in ¿'.Por qué Chiapas? (Why 
Chiapas ?) reflects the success of Zapatista strategy. His 
observation that the EZLN and neosocialists simply 
substitute 'neoliberalism' for the term 'capitalism' lends 
credence to his assessment of Zapatista rhetoric as Marxist 
Leninist "... schemes expressed with different words" (12- 
13). But he neglects the literature of those who embrace 
the mantle of neoliberalism (i.e. Berger, Levine, Vargas 
Llosa et al.) which indicates that the Zapatistas have 
twisted the meaning of the word to their advantage. This 
suggests that Pazos is too steeped in neoclassical economics 
to recognize the scope of Zapatista strategy. Had he 
exposed how the EZLN has publicized a distorted version of 
neoliberal goals and remedies, Pazos could have made a 
stronger case for the implementation of more of his free 
market cures for Mexico. In effect, Marcos defined 
neoliberalism for Pazos as laissez -faire capitalism and 
Pazos eagerly swallowed the bait. 
This is a fair deduction given that ,:.Por qué Chiapas? 
is Pazos' response to the Zapatista rebellion. In 76 
Zapata's Revenge, Barry also focuses on the events in 
Chiapas. He does classify some nonmarket strategies as the 
"... more human side of neoliberalism..." (240); but his 
appraisal of neoliberal convictions as the mere 
international market postulates of privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization implies that he too has 
ignored a wide range of neoliberal literature and 
acknowledged the Zapatista explanation of the philosophy.6 
In his analysis of Latin America, Castañeda refers to a 
"...new strain of Latin American left..." (234) in Chiapas 
and classifies neoliberalism as the "... pro business, free 
market... modern right" (134). Because of the broad scope 
of Utopia Unarmed, and the fact that it was written before 
the Chiapas rebellion, this characterization of 
neoliberalism is not colored by Zapatista propaganda. 
Still, Castañeda's treatment of neoliberalism demonstrates 
the popular conception of the philosophy as equivalent to 
radical laissez -faire market solutions for the economic and 
social problems of Latin America. Castañeda, like so many 
of his ilk, chooses the invention of a synonym for 
capitalism instead of a definition of an original, 
contemporary ideal neoliberalism: the ultimate goal of 
political and economic freedom. 
All three authors, Pazos, Barry and Castañeda, stress 
the importance of democracy. Barry laments the "...profound 
lack of democracy and government accountability in 77 
Mexico..." (7), while Castañeda reminds us that democracy is 
imperative but always difficult because "... the Jacobin, 
antidemocratic streak was present in Latin American 
political culture long before anyone had ever heard of 
Lenin..." (328). For his part, Pazos insists that the 
Zapatistas should have searched for a political resolution 
before turning to violence.' Aside from the proponents of 
neoliberalism published in El desafío neoliberal (The 
Neoliberal Challenge), none of the sources cited herein 
stress the democratic tenets of neoliberalism or its ability 
to employ a gradual process of economic liberalization when 
across the board free market solutions are not viable. 
The analyses of events surrounding the Zapatista 
insurrection tend to obscure a couple of salient points. In 
the first place, the Zapatistas, in their militant fervor 
against neoliberalism, overlook the fact that their nemesis 
is not neoliberalism per se but the unadulterated, 'leave it 
to the market,' laissez -faire economic solutions that were 
imposed on the country without any formal democratic 
debate.' Secondly, the democratic ideal is something that 
the EZLN and neoliberalism have in common. This common 
ground can provide a foundation for resolving the social, 
political and economic problems of Mexico. 
Within the dictates of a democracy that holds its 
leaders responsible for corruption, the various types of 78 
"'capitalisms' prevailing in the modern world" (Castañeda 
316), such as the social market economy of Europe, can 
provide a model for a prosperous future for Mexico and 
Chiapas within a free market (neoliberal) system. But much 
of the rhetoric coming from the Zapatista camp resembles 
leftist nationalism without a remedy. There is no regard 
for the different types of capitalism in extant or the 
democratic ideals of neoliberalism itself. It is as if 
neoliberalism really was nothing more than neo- classical 
capitalism taken to its ultimate ends. As far as the ruling 
Mexican party is concerned, it employs a paternal, 
exclusionary nationalism. Under the guise of protecting 
peasants, the government effectively precludes large 
populations of them from acquiring land, having an equal 
voice in government and participating in debates about the 
economic and political future of the nation.' This has a 
polarizing effect which has left Chiapas and much of the 
country deprived of economic and political liberty. 
The architects of NAFTA may truly desire a prosperous 
Mexico, but for one reason or another they have completely 
neglected the fact that most of Mexico's problems are of a 
political nature. This neglect is so profound that the 
architects and political sponsors of the treaty cannot and 
should not be classified as neoliberal. Purely economic 
remedies for Mexico might bring prosperity to some in the 
short run. Yet for the long haul, all three countries, 79 
Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, must rededicate themselves to 
the establishment of true Mexican democracy complete with a 
separation of powers and guarantees of individual rights. 
Within this framework, questions of economic liberty and 
free trade can be left to open debates in the Mexican 
congress. 
The result of such debates will probably lead to some 
kind of protection for poverty stricken Chiapas. This 
is only logical as no country 
...has captured markets or attained inter- 
national competitiveness exclusively by 
opening up economies and letting the chips 
fall where they may. Britain in the nine- 
teenth century and the United States after 
World War II were free traders because they 
were the world's most efficient producers of 
the highest value -added goods. They did not 
become so through free trade; they protected 
themselves for decades in order to achieve 
that end (Castañeda 464). 
Castañeda's historical account supports the neoliberal idea 
of gradual economic liberalization for Mexico. It also 
includes an ultimate goal of economic liberty within the 
reality of a globalized market. 
Because of the incompetence of Mexico's perfect 
dictatorship and the negligence of the country's northern 
neighbors, one can hardly blame the EZLN for seizing upon 
neoliberalism and NAFTA as its enemies. Unfortunately, the 
armed insurrection and the subsequent powerful media 
campaign have led to a protracted struggle in which a 
decision to change Zapatista rhetoric could be perceived 80 
within the movement as tantamount to military surrender and 
defeat. Be that as it may, the Zapatista leadership, and 
Marcos in particular, must realize that campesinos need the 
external help of a market economy. Le Bot has referred to 
this inevitable integration of the peasantry into the market 
as a "... campesino market economy" (105). Furthermore, the 
Latin American left in general has finally come to accept 
international economic integration and the market as 
inescapable realities that cannot be ignored or shunned.'° 
Socialists must learn to live with the most 
advanced forms of capitalism... But they need 
not be identified, in their values or their 
movements, with the 'soul' of capitalism. 
Socialists should marry democracy out of love, 
but their union with the market need be no 
more than a 'marriage of convenience.'" 
Castañeda once pronounced, "Marcos had the opportunity 
to enter into the political arena" (Le Bot 250). Maybe it 
is not too late. If Marcos recognizes the need for a 
marriage of convenience with the market and accepts the 
neoliberal call for democracy as his own, he can forge an 
agreement with the government without ever publicly 
acquiescing to the neoliberal enemy. To preserve the peace, 
he must also take off the mask and thrust himself and the 
Zapatistas into the quagmire of Mexican politics. 
While the EZLN reviles the neoliberal Mexican 
government, the PRI does not openly identify itself with 
neoliberalism. Clearly, the ruling party will not allow 
itself to be defined by the Zapatistas. Yet overall, the 81 
Mexican government has demonstrated few neoliberal ideals. 
It is true that the transition to real democracy and 
economic liberty is not instantaneous. But political 
liberty for Mexico can no longer be subordinated to the goal 
of economic liberty. For any negotiations with the EZLN to 
have hope of success, the government must now accept and 
endorse neoliberalism's incontrovertible democratic 
principles. The neoliberal remedy of gradual economic 
liberalization must be given serious consideration as well, 
especially as applied to Chiapas. It is not important that 
the government or the EZLN recognize these cures and 
principles as neoliberal. In fact, it is advisable that the 
word 'neoliberalism' be dropped entirely from the vocabulary 
of both parties during private negotiations so as not to 
rankle sensibilities. (Publicly, Zapatista rhetoric against 
neoliberalism will probably change very little.) What is 
important is that the full scope of neoliberal ideals be 
taken advantage of. It may not be easy to back away from 
NAFTA in its current form as the agreement appears to be set 
in perpetuity. "But a deal can be struck" (Castañeda 467). 
Through these efforts, the EZLN and the government will free 
themselves from Plato's cave and discover the common ground 
on which all Mexicans can build their future. 82 
Conclusion 
Agrarian Reform and Education 
One of the architects of free trade throughout the 
Americas is the Inter American Development Bank (not to be 
confused with the International Monetary Fund). In an 
interview with the Los Angeles Times, the bank's current 
president, Enrique Iglesias, stressed the importance of 
economic and social efficiency within a democratic system: 
There may be times in which we try to maximize 
economic efficiency at the expense of social 
efficiency, and, sometimes, that leads to 
confrontation. We also have other periods in 
which we try to maximize social efficiency 
while neglecting the economic side, and we end 
in populism, high inflation and backwardness. 
The big test is to have a good combination of 
policies that can, at the same time, assure 
sustainable growth with social justice and a 
reduction of poverty.' 
Iglesias goes on to insist that the economic reforms put 
into place in Mexico and other Latin American countries are 
important for stability, modernization and the distribution 
of wealth: 
...in essence, those reforms were pushed by 
the big economic mismanagement that we had in 
practically every country in the region... 
These are prerequisites to implement solid 
social policies that will close the gap 
[between rich and poor]... 
Thus Mexico was destined to implement economic reforms 
before political and social problems were addressed. 
However, according to Iglesias, political, economic and 
social reforms do not represent quick cures to the question 83 
of poverty: 
Poverty has deep historical roots in the 
region. It starts with the ways wealth, par- 
ticularly land, was distributed in Latin 
America. We also had mismanagement of the 
economy and the ensuing inflation that 
imposes a tremendous burden on poor people... 
But when I look at the major element at the 
root of poverty and inequality, it is, in my 
mind, the education gap. It is really too 
sad to admit that, in this area, we have not 
done enough. 
At the moment, economic and political liberty are 
developing more or less simultaneously in Mexico. But the 
interview with Iglesias clarifies why economic 
liberalization and the implementation of NAFTA preceded 
political reform in the country. Although Iglesias does not 
specifically speak to Mexico's fundamental need for 
political liberty (his answers are framed within the context 
of a democratic system), he does touch on two areas of 
importance to the future of Mexico: agrarian reform and 
education. 
"'Wherever there is great property there is great 
inequality... The affluence of the rich supposes the 
indigence of the many.'" (Heilbroner 44). These words of 
wisdom sound like something Karl Marx or Subcommander Marcos 
might say. In fact, it is an insight given to us by the 
first great philosopher of capitalism: Adam Smith. Smith 
also asserts "that we are the creatures of a 'desire of 
bettering our condition'" (Heilbroner 45). In Adam Smith's 
Society of Perfect Liberty, these desires are not left alone 84 
to do battle in a free market. The state still has 
indispensable responsibilities including the duties of 
erecting and maintaining certain public works and 
institutions as well as protecting every member of society 
from injustice or oppression.' 
By dispossessing people of their land and failing to 
provide for an economy that can promote and ensure the 
acquisition of property, goods and services, the Mexican 
state has propagated the type of oppression that often leads 
to violent rebellions. The ejido system points to 
government culpability. It dispossesses people of great 
tracks of land in order to reapportion it. Yet 
reapportionment does not result in land for the people. 
Campesinos never own the land. The government retains title 
to the ejidos. The peasants have little if any capital to 
work the ejidos and they cannot mortgage or borrow on the 
land to acquire said capital. Consequently, they are stuck 
in everlasting poverty along with millions of other 
Mexicans, campesinos and city dwellers, as the state 
bureaucracy fails to provide economic opportunity or 
liberty. 
At times, it is truly baffling that the Zapatistas 
fight for the ejido. A better idea, already practiced to a 
degree, might be just to give the peasants land. A very 
real fear that latifundios would proliferate as campesinos 
sell or lose out to the highest bidder inhibits further 85 
privatization of this nature. Also, there are more 
campesinos than ever before. With the 21st century upon 
them, their numbers grow. Free land for all peasants is not 
a viable solution. And the impractical ejido system is now 
hopelessly dated in a country where the need for increased 
food production as well as alternative economic 
opportunities for the peasantry will grow with an expanding 
Mexican population. 
The ejido has been dying a slow death for years. 
Economic reform in Mexico and NAFTA suggest that its total 
demise is not far off. In any event, campesinos will not 
just fade away. Without alternatives to their current 
agricultural lifestyle, new problems and violent upheavals 
are bound to occur. On the other hand, economic opportunity 
in the coming decades could provide campesinos with a 
distinct future. A future where Mexican campesinos are no 
longer peasants. 
Education will be instrumental in this development. 
Education is a Zapatista demand that has few detractors. 
Some dissenting voices equate state sponsored education of 
campesino and indigenous populations with cultural genocide. 
But elevating these people from their penury through 
education and economic opportunity need not destroy their 
cultural heritage. Mid -21st century Mexican Indians should 
be able to communicate in Nahuatl (or other indigenous 
languages) as well as literate, fluent Spanish. Education 86 
can conserve traditions and language as well as ensure the 
acquisition of new knowledge; a means to property and land. 
As the past is preserved through family, community and 
education, leaps into the computer age, or even suburbia, 
can be facilitated. Zapatista demands for housing, food, 
employment and peace will be satisfied. Minifundismo would 
be but a memory and those working in the agricultural sector 
will rarely represent the dwindling peasant class. As has 
been the case throughout history, cultural changes are 
inevitable. Still, this must be the destiny of a democratic 
Mexico that affords campesinos the opportunities to support 
and elevate themselves; that extends a helping hand instead 
of the oppressive, paternal one that has perpetuated misery 
throughout Chiapas and the nation. 
Globalization is indeed a reality. Never before has 
the social and economic future of the planet been so 
dependent on the interaction of its parts. The scientific 
and technological advances of the last century have created 
an age of easy travel and accessible information. The world 
is a smaller place. Even so, we do not need to contemplate 
and study the entire world in order to understand the 
consequences of globalization. NAFTA and the events in 
Chiapas provide us with a microcosm of the reality. In this 
corner of a globalized world, hard lessons are learned. And 
more solutions than problems can be found. 87 
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6. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 
1995) 45. Barry equates the commitments of World Bank 
planners and the "PRI technocrat elite" with radical 
economic liberalization and neoliberalist philosophy. 
7. Luis Pazos, ¿,Por qué Chiapas? (Mexico D.F.: Editorial 
Diana S.A. de C.V., 1994) 89 -90. 
8. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books 
Edition, 1994) 316. 
9. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books 
Edition, 1994) 324. Castañeda refers to the exclusionary 
nature of Latin American nationalism in general. 
10. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books 
Edition, 1994) 325, 461 -2. On page 325, Castañeda points 
out that a "... few years ago, the very notion that the 
Latin American left could subscribe to the idea of 
restructuring existing mechanisms of integration would have 
been virtually inconceivable." Pages 461 -2 reiterate this 
point: "... to bestow a central role also on the private 
sector, and to accept that the market should have a dominant 
function in the process, represents a major break for the 
left..." 
11. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: First Vintage 
Books Edition, 1994) 432. Castañeda quotes Fancisco 
Weffort. 
Conclusion 
1. Sergio Muñoz, "Enrique Iglesias" Los Angeles Times 7 
March 1999, M3. 
2. Robert Heilbroner, 21st Century Capitalism, (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 70 -1. Adam Smith's Society of 
Perfect Liberty tackles the problem of the division of 
authority and the duties of each realm. In his assessment 
of the duties of the state, Heilbroner quotes from Smith's 
Wealth. 100 
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